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LITIGATION AS PARENTING
LISA V. MARTIN*
Children have legal rights. Yet, children typically lack the legal capacity to represent
their interests in courts. When federal courts are presented with children’s claims,
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require courts to ensure that children’s legal
interests are adequately protected. To do so, courts decide who can speak and make
decisions for the child within the litigation. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c)
maps out a loose process for addressing these concerns but fails to fully account for
a critical factor in protecting child litigants: the decisionmaking rights of parents.
Because parents have constitutionally protected authority to make important deci-
sions for their children, litigation brought on a child’s behalf presents a collision of
rights and obligations between parents, children, and “the state,” here, the federal
courts. Court doctrine interpreting Rule 17(c) is tangled and inconsistent and fails
to offer clear guidance regarding what preference, if any, parents should have to
represent their children’s interests in litigation. This Article proposes for the first
time that constitutional doctrine establishing parents’ protected decisionmaking
authority should make parents the default representatives for their children in fed-
eral civil litigation. The Article presents an account of court practices and an analyt-
ical framework to guide courts’ application of Rule 17(c), which implements the
general constitutional rule of parent priority while upholding the courts’ responsi-
bility to protect children’s interests.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1966, fifteen-year-old John Tinker and thirteen-year-old Mary
Beth Tinker wore black armbands to school to protest the govern-
ment’s policies on Vietnam.1 Mary Beth and John were suspended for
expressing their beliefs. Their father, Leonard Tinker, filed a legal
case on their behalf challenging the punishment, which ultimately
resulted in one of the most impactful First Amendment opinions in
Supreme Court jurisprudence and the Court’s recognition that the
First Amendment’s free expression guarantees do not stop at the
schoolhouse gates.2 But what if the trial court had not permitted the
Tinkers’ father to represent their interests in the litigation? What if
the court had appointed a guardian ad litem to speak for the children
instead? That court-appointed advocate could have decided that set-
tling the case to clear the children’s discipline records better served
their interests than litigating to take a stand on free speech in schools
and accordingly could have agreed on the children’s behalf to resolve
the case without trial.
Under current court practice, the Tinker case easily could have
taken this route. In fact, federal courts claim near absolute discretion
to either permit a parent to represent a child’s interests or to displace
the parent as decisionmaker with another party selected by the court.3
This Article argues that such unbridled discretion is misplaced as a
legal and policy matter.
The law recognizes that children are not mini-adults and need
special protection during childhood. Legal doctrine vests two separate
authorities with the responsibility to protect children: parents and the
state. Generally, the law entrusts parents to care for their children and
protects parents’ role as decisionmakers on their children’s behalf.4
1 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).
2 Id. at 506 (“First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of
the school environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that
either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate.”).
3 See infra Part I.
4 See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (“Our jurisprudence historically has
reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority
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Parents’ role as decisionmakers for their children is constitutionally
protected5 and routinely illustrated in parents’ and children’s daily
lives.6 Parents not only must enroll their children in school and con-
sent to children’s medical treatment, but also routinely must affirma-
tively consent to field trips, consumption of snacks,7 use of sunscreen
and bug spray,8 participation in extracurricular activities, and the col-
lection and use of their children’s information and imagery.9 Beyond
consent, parents often are asked to prospectively waive claims of lia-
bility as a prerequisite to children’s participation in recreational activi-
ties and forms of entertainment.10 Save for certain matters affecting
the broader society or evidence of parental unfitness, when the state
steps in to protect children under its parens patriae and police
powers,11 parents’ rights over their children are paramount and
over minor children.”); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (“The history
and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the
nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents . . . is now
established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.”); infra Part II.
5 See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (plurality opinion) (“[I]t cannot
now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the
fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control
of their children.”).
6 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 637 (1979) (plurality opinion) (“The State
commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental action and from their own
immaturity by requiring parental consent to or involvement in important decisions by
minors.”).
7 See, e.g., Lenore Skenazy, I Have to Sign a Permission Slip so My Middle Schooler
Can Eat an Oreo, FREE RANGE KIDS (Mar. 25, 2015), www.freerangekids.com/i-have-to-
sign-a-permission-slip-so-my-middle-schooler-can-eat-an-oreo.
8 See, e.g., Sunscreen and Insect Repellent - Permission, BRIGHT HORIZONS (Oct.
2018), https://enroll.brighthorizons.com/-/media/bh/enroll/insect-repellant_sunscreen_us
.ashx (form published by operator of more than one thousand daycare centers across the
United States).
9 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2012); Complying
with COPPA: Frequently Asked Questions, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Mar. 20, 2015), https://
www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/complying-coppa-frequently-asked-
questions.
10 See Paul Sullivan, Who’s at Fault? Read the Fine Print to Make Sure You’re Not at
Risk, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/12/your-money/
liability-waivers.html (describing how parents are regularly required to sign waivers for
their children’s use of recreational equipment like trampolines); see also Daniel Akst,
Opinion, Those Crazy Indemnity Forms We All Sign, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2012), https://
www.nytimes.com/2012/12/09/opinion/sunday/those-crazy-indemnity-forms-we-all-sign
.html (articulating that parents must choose to sign indemnification forms for
entertainment activities or have their children excluded from those activities entirely).
11 See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (defining the protection of
morality as a fundamental part of the government’s police power); see also Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766–68 (1982) (holding that the State’s parens patriae interest in
promoting the welfare of children justifies removing children from their parents only upon
a finding of parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence).
42229-nyu_95-2 Sheet No. 44 Side A      05/12/2020   08:24:24
42229-nyu_95-2 Sheet No. 44 Side A      05/12/2020   08:24:24
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\95-2\NYU202.txt unknown Seq: 4 11-MAY-20 14:58
May 2020] LITIGATION AS PARENTING 445
fundamental.12
This dual responsibility for children sometimes creates conflict
between parents and the state; and, in most circumstances, the
Supreme Court defers to parents.13 Constitutional doctrine presumes
that parents act in their children’s best interests and parents’ decisions
must be respected, even when imperfect.14 The state may intervene in
parental decisionmaking only when a parent’s decisions pose a signifi-
cant risk of harm to a child or the broader populace.15
Counterintuitively, the opposite is true when children bring
claims in federal courts. Federal procedural doctrine fails to account
for the primacy of parental decisionmaking authority in the context of
civil litigation. Instead, it allows courts to circumvent parents as repre-
sentatives of their children’s interests in civil litigation. When we envi-
sion litigants before the courts, we typically think of adults. Yet,
children are persons before the law and enjoy many of the same legal
rights and protections as adults do.16 Because they enjoy legal rights,
children often have standing to sue.17 Indeed, children’s civil claims in
12 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“[T]he custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first in the parents . . . .”).
13 See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 654 (1972) (requiring that unmarried
fathers, like other parents, be found unfit before the state may remove children from their
custody); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (invalidating a statute
compelling public school attendance for invading parents’ right to control their child’s
upbringing); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402–03 (1923) (invalidating a prohibition on
teaching non-English languages to children in the eighth grade and below); see infra
Section II.A (outlining the constitutional protection for parental decisionmaking).
14 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72–73 (2000) (plurality opinion).
15 See Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176–77 (1922) (upholding vaccination requirement
for school attendance against equal protection and due process challenge); see also infra
Section II.A.
16 “Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one
attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the
Constitution and possess constitutional rights.” Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976); see also Petersen v. City & County of Honolulu, 462 P.2d
1007, 1009 (Haw. 1969) (“[I]n general, minor children are entitled to the same redress for
wrongs done them as are any other persons.”); Wilbon v. D.F. Bast Co., 382 N.E.2d 784,
790–91 (Ill. 1978) (“[A] minor should not be precluded from enforcing his rights unless
clearly debarred from so doing by some statute or constitutional provision.” (quoting
Walgreen Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 153 N.E. 831, 833 (Ill. 1926))); Sorensen v. Sorensen, 339
N.E.2d 907, 912 (Mass. 1975) (noting that, absent a valid statute or constitutional provision
to the contrary, “[c]hildren enjoy the same right to protection and legal redress for wrongs
done [to] them” as adults); Lee v. Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721, 722–23 (W. Va. 1976) (“We
perceive no reason why minor children should not enjoy the same right to legal redress for
wrongs done to them as others enjoy.”).
17 Standing is the “right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or
right.” Standing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). “A plaintiff’s age is not
determinative of standing; children possess certain personal rights that are enforceable in
federal court.” Gonzalez ex rel. Gonzalez v. Reno, 86 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1180–81 (S.D.
Fla.), aff’d sub nom. Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2000).
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federal court run the full gamut of potential case types.18 But chil-
dren’s status as legal “minors”19 means that they lack the legal
“capacity”20 to represent their interests before courts and must have
an adult representative act on their behalf in civil litigation.21 Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c) (Rule 17(c)) establishes a hierarchy of
possible adult representatives for children and requires courts to
ensure that the interests of unrepresented children are protected.22
Despite that parents are most often the adults who bring children’s
claims, Rule 17(c) does not mention them, leaving it to courts to
determine how parents fit within the terminology and processes estab-
lished by the Rule.23
Courts have exercised this authority expansively, claiming full
discretion to determine who should speak for child litigants.24 In doing
18 An empirical review of federal claims brought on behalf of minors from 2015–2018
revealed a range of claims including: torts, disability rights, consumer protection,
educational rights, civil rights, immigration, bankruptcy, and social security. The cases were
identified by Key Citing and Shepherdizing Rule 17(c) in the Westlaw and Lexis Advance
databases, reviewing relevant American Law Reports case compilations, and filtering the
cases involving claims brought on behalf of minors (as opposed to adults lacking legal
capacity). Lisa V. Martin, Table: Cases Brought on Behalf of Minors in Federal Courts
2015–2018 (unpublished table) (on file with author) [hereinafter Table: Cases 2015–2018]
(listing eighty-seven cases); cf. Lisa V. Martin, No Right to Counsel, No Access Without:
The Poor Child’s Unconstitutional Catch-22, 71 Fla. L. Rev. 831, 839 & n.45 (2019)
[hereinafter Martin, No Right to Counsel] (describing research indicating that among cases
involving the question of whether an adult representative could represent a child pro se, a
majority of underlying claims were civil rights claims, with disability rights and tort claims
making up the next two highest proportions).
19 Minority is “[t]he quality, state, or condition of being under legal age.” Minority,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Today most states establish eighteen as the age
of legal majority, with a few states retaining nineteen or twenty-one, the traditional age of
majority at common law. NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE LAWS 564–74 (Richard A. Leiter
ed., 6th ed. 2008).
20 Capacity is a party’s “satisfaction of a legal qualification, such as legal age or
soundness of mind, that determines one’s ability to sue or be sued.” Capacity, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
21 4 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 17.21[3][a] & n.16 (3d
ed. 2019).
22 FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c).
23 See, e.g., Johnson v. Collins, 5 F. App’x 479, 485 (7th Cir. 2001) (“To maintain a suit
in a federal court, a child or mental incompetent must be represented by a competent
adult, ordinarily a parent or relative.”); Gonzalez-Jimenez de Ruiz v. United States, 231 F.
Supp. 2d 1187, 1196 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (“Typically, ‘the next friend who sues on behalf of the
minor is that minor’s parent.’” (quoting Gonzalez ex rel. Gonzalez v. Reno, 86 F. Supp. 2d
1167, 1183 (S.D. Fla.), aff’d sub nom. Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2000));
Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interests in the Representation of Children, 64 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1819, 1846 (1996) (“[E]xcluding cases of inherent conflict such as custody, abuse or
neglect, and termination of parental rights . . . parents are expected not only to ‘foot the
bill [for counsel],’ but also to play an active role in directing the course of the
representation.” (citations omitted)).
24 See infra Part I.
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so, courts utterly fail to recognize that courts’ authority is limited by
parents’ constitutionally protected decisionmaking rights.25 In short,
federal courts fail to understand that by acting as representatives in
these claims parent representatives are parenting. Thus, although the
Constitution generally protects parents’ rights to make decisions for
their children absent some kind of parental failure, the deference nor-
mally accorded to parental decisionmaking vanishes when parents set
foot in a federal courtroom to take legal action on behalf of a child.
This lack of deference to parents as representatives for their chil-
dren, as a practical matter, means that parents who bring federal civil
claims on behalf of their children face uncertainty as to whether courts
will: permit parents to represent their children as a matter of course,
require parents to advocate for and justify why parents should be
granted that privilege, or supplant parents entirely in favor of an alter-
nate representative. Although federal courts actually sideline parent
representatives in only a small number of published cases, courts often
avoid the question entirely by dismissing cases brought on behalf of
minors on a separate basis.26 Under current federal practice, courts
routinely dismiss cases brought by parents pro se on behalf of minors
for lack of counsel.27 Court rhetoric in these cases suggests that courts
might exercise their claimed discretion to supplant parents more fre-
quently were more cases brought by low-income parents on behalf of
minors permitted to proceed.28
Federal courts’ failure to defer to parents as children’s legal rep-
resentatives in litigation as a default rule causes several harms. It
deprives parents of their constitutional right to protect their children’s
interests as they see fit. It deprives children of the assurance that their
interests will be represented by those who know them best. It imposes
25 See infra Part II. Courts’ failure to recognize the family law implications of federal
procedure in this context is consistent with scholars’ observation that family law is often
invisible within federal constitutional law and procedure. See Jill Elaine Hasday, The
Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 870–71 (2004) (describing the “exclusion of
federal law from the family law canon”); Emily J. Sack, The Burial of Family Law, 61 SMU
L. REV. 459, 473–79 (2008) (discussing how family law is largely not present in federal and
constitutional law).
26 In a study of federal cases brought on behalf of minors in 2015–2018, the author
identified five cases in which federal courts appointed guardians ad litem to represent
minor children in lieu of a parent out of seventy-eight total cases in which parents sought
to serve as a child’s legal representative. Table: Cases 2015–2018, supra note 18.
27 Martin, No Right to Counsel, supra note 18, at 833.
28 See, e.g., Oliver v. Southcoast Med. Grp., No. CV411-115, 2011 WL 2600618, at *1
n.5 (S.D. Ga. June 13, 2011) (dismissing claim brought by father on behalf of his daughter
for lack of counsel, noting that the court has no need to assess the father’s ability to serve
as the child’s representative because of his failure to retain counsel, and suggesting that he
may not be found competent to serve, in part, because “there is some case law indicating
that financial wherewithal to competently litigate is a factor”).
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significant financial costs where guardians ad litem are appointed.
And it imposes upon litigants, counsel, and courts themselves the
burden of having to relitigate the question of who should speak for a
child in every case.
In what is now a developing body of law governing the relation-
ship between the parent, child, and state, this intrusion by the federal
courts on parental decisionmaking power has been overlooked.29 To
fill that gap and avoid these harms, this Article proposes for the first
time that constitutional doctrine should govern courts’ assessment of
who should represent child litigants under Rule 17(c).30 Specifically,
courts should implement a presumption favoring parents as the appro-
priate representatives for their children in civil litigation and appoint a
non-parent representative over a parent’s objection only upon evi-
dence that parent representation itself will cause significant harm.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I maps courts’ treatment
of parents as representatives for their children under Rule 17(c). This
Part explores the doctrine surrounding the various adult representa-
tives permitted to represent children’s interests before federal courts
and evaluates the disparities in courts’ understandings of how parents
fit into this landscape. The myriad inconsistencies in the doctrine iden-
tified by this Part illustrate the need for a unified standard. Part II
proposes that standard. Drawing on constitutional principles, it
presents a doctrinal justification for a default rule of court deference
to parents as the adults who should generally represent their chil-
dren’s interests in federal litigation. It develops a novel theoretical
account of parent representatives as parenting through representative
litigation. Conceiving of litigation as a parenting choice, the Part con-
siders the harms of courts’ present failure to defer to parents and eval-
uates why deference serves children’s interests. Part III proposes an
29 Although scholars have extensively debated parents rights vis-a`-vis children’s rights
and those two sets of rights vis-a`-vis the state, none have yet explored how the courts
intrude on parents’ constitutional rights when children bring civil claims in federal court.
See, e.g., MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 17–50 (2005);
Emily Buss, Essay, “Parental” Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 635 (2002); Clare Huntington &
Elizabeth S. Scott, Conceptualizing Legal Childhood in the Twenty-First Century, MICH. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2020); Michael S. Wald, Children’s Rights: A Framework for Analysis,
12 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255 (1979); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Who Owns the Child?
Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995 (1992).
30 Cf. Martin, No Right to Counsel, supra note 18, at 872–74 (arguing that parents’
choices about whether to retain counsel in cases brought to advance children’s civil legal
claims warrant court deference in light of parents’ constitutionally protected
decisionmaking authority). Of course, another factor in these cases potentially entails a
child’s separate right to access the courts and advance legal claims to which a parent
objects. That topic is the subject of a work in progress by the author. This Article’s primary
focus is on cases in which parents’ and children’s rights and interests align, and thus
touches only briefly on circumstances of parent/child conflict in Part III.
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analytical framework that would enable courts to implement a pre-
sumption in favor of parents as the default representatives for chil-
dren’s claims while still fulfilling their responsibility to protect
children’s interests and respecting children’s own fundamental rights.
I
CHILDREN’S REPRESENTATIVES UNDER RULE 17(C)
Federal courts are charged with ensuring that the interests of
child litigants are adequately protected. But courts operate as though
this authority gives them total discretion to determine who should
represent a child’s interests in litigation, without engaging in any anal-
ysis of the constitutional implications of this approach. In exercising
this discretion, courts take widely variant approaches. Courts catego-
rize parents as qualifying to serve in different roles and articulate dif-
ferent processes and standards that parents must meet to secure court
approval to serve as a child’s legal representative. Consequently, court
doctrine interpreting Rule 17(c) is tangled and inconsistent and fails
to provide clear guidance regarding how courts should proceed when
presented with child litigants and how parents should be treated as
prospective representatives for children. The resulting doctrinal mess
is harmful for child litigants and their parents.
A. Courts’ Authority to Protect Child Litigants
Federal courts exercise inherent powers to regulate the lawyers
and parties who appear before them,31 including the authority to
require “submission to their lawful mandates”32 and establish rules of
procedure.33 Further, federal courts historically have imposed upon
themselves a special common law obligation to protect the interests of
child litigants.34 Courts typically describe their responsibility for child
litigants in overly expansive terms, by, for example, referring to child
31 Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962).
32 Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821).
33 See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 1 (1825).
34 See Coulson v. Walton, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 62, 84 (1835) (“It is the duty of the court to
protect the interests of minors . . . .”); see also Bank of United States v. Ritchie, 33 U.S. (8
Pet.) 128, 144 (1834) (“In all suits brought against infants, whom the law supposes to be
incapable of understanding and managing their own affairs, the duty of watching over their
interests devolves, in a considerable degree, upon the court.”). Courts have expressed this
objective in strong terms, with several declaring: “The infant is always the ward of every
court wherein his rights or property are brought into jeopardy, and is entitled to the most
jealous care that no injustice be done to him.” Wenger v. Canastota Cent. Sch. Dist., 146
F.3d 123, 125 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (quoting Johns v. County of San Diego, 114 F.3d
874, 877 (9th Cir. 1997)), abrogated in part by Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City
Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007).
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litigants as “wards of the court”35—a phrase typically reserved for
children deemed by a court to have been abused or neglected by an
unfit parent—and portraying the court as the true guardian of chil-
dren.36 As the governmental parens patriae power to protect children
rests exclusively with the states, federal courts’ protective role is
strictly limited to the bounds of federal litigation, and it in no way
approaches the relationship between guardian and ward in any literal
sense.37
Rule 17(c) reflects courts’ historical responsibility and outlines
the minimum steps courts must take when presented with a child liti-
gant.38 A primary concern for such courts includes ensuring that the
child has an appropriate adult representative to make decisions for
the child within the litigation. Rule 17(c) establishes a hierarchy
among potential adult representatives according to an adult’s relation-
ship with the child.39 The Rule provides:
(c) Minor or Incompetent Person.
(1) With a Representative. The following representatives may sue
or defend on behalf of a minor or an incompetent person:
(A) a general guardian;
(B) a committee;
(C) a conservator; or
(D) a like fiduciary.
(2) Without a Representative. A minor or an incompetent person
who does not have a duly appointed representative may sue by a
next friend or by a guardian ad litem. The court must appoint a
35 See, e.g., duPont v. S. Nat’l Bank of Hous., 771 F.2d 874, 882 (5th Cir. 1985) (citation
omitted); Dacanay v. Mendoza, 573 F.2d 1075, 1079 (9th Cir. 1978) (“It is an ancient
precept of Anglo-American jurisprudence that infant and other incompetent parties are
wards of any court called upon to measure and weigh their interests.”).
36 See, e.g., Anderson v. SAM Airlines, No. 94 Civ. 1935 (ERK), 1997 WL 1179955, at
*8 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 1997) (“Indeed, it is the judge who truly stands in a guardian/ward
relationship with the infant. ‘The guardian ad litem is appointed merely to aid and to
enable the court to perform that duty of protection.’” (first citation omitted) (quoting
duPont, 771 F.2d at 882)).
37 See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972) (“In the United
States, the ‘royal prerogative’ and the ‘parens patriae’ function of the King passed to the
States.”); Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S. (1 How.) 369, 384 (1855) (“The State, as a sovereign,
is the parens patriae . . . . Powers not judicial, exercised by the chancellor merely as the
representative of the sovereign, and by virtue of the king’s prerogative as parens patriae,
are not possessed by the circuit courts.”).
38 See Garrick v. Weaver, 888 F.2d 687, 693 (10th Cir. 1989) (“Rule 17(c) flows from
the general duty of the court to protect the interests of infants and incompetents in cases
before the court.”); see also Adelman ex rel. Adelman v. Graves, 747 F.2d 986, 989 (5th
Cir. 1984) (“[T]he district court’s primary concern in the instant case must be to assure,
under Rule 17(c), that [the child’s] interests in vindicating his statutory and constitutional
rights are properly protected.”).
39  FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c).
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guardian ad litem—or issue another appropriate order—to protect
a minor or incompetent person who is unrepresented in an action.40
The Rule defers to general representatives for a child as the
appropriate litigation representatives for children. General represent-
atives exercise broad and ongoing decisionmaking responsibilities in a
child’s life beyond the bounds of an individual case.41 The Rule per-
mits representation by special representatives—individuals appointed
to exercise decisionmaking responsibilities for a child within the
bounds of a particular case42—only where a child lacks a general rep-
resentative, or a general representative is unavailable, or inadequate
(for example, because of a conflict of interest).43 Thus, when
presented with a child litigant, courts must first assess whether a child
has a general representative.44 Children lacking a general representa-
tive may appear by a special representative, namely, a next friend or
guardian ad litem, if that representative meets the court’s approval.45
When a child has no adult representative, a court may appoint a
guardian ad litem or take other action to protect the child’s interests
in a case.46 Regardless of their particular designation within a case,
40 Id.
41 T.W. ex rel. Enk v. Brophy, 124 F.3d 893, 895–96 (7th Cir. 1997). See generally 6A
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1570 (3d ed.
2010) (identifying individuals included in 17(c)(1) as general representatives for an infant
or incompetent).
42 Brophy, 124 F.3d at 895 (“Rule 17(c) distinguishes between a guardian or other ‘duly
appointed representative,’ on the one hand—in short, a general representative—and a
guardian ad litem or a next friend, on the other hand—a special representative.”); Noe v.
True, 507 F.2d 9, 12 (6th Cir. 1974) (“[A]n appointed guardian ad litem does not replace a
general guardian for all purposes, but is ‘appointed as a representative of the court to act
for the minor in the cause . . . .’” (quoting Fong Sik Leung v. Dulles, 226 F.2d 74, 82 (9th
Cir. 1955) (Boldt, J., concurring))). See generally 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 41, § 1570
(noting that courts are empowered to appoint a special representative where a general
representative refuses to act or has interests that conflict with those of the person
represented).
43 See Garrick, 888 F.2d at 692–93 (“[W]here the infant or incompetent is represented
by a general guardian or conservator, a next friend lacks standing absent express consent
or court order.” (citing Susan R.M. v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., 818 F.2d 455, 458 (5th Cir.
1987); Developmental Disabilities Advocacy Ctr., Inc. v. Melton, 689 F.2d 281, 285–86 (1st
Cir. 1982) (refusing next-friend standing when parent/legal guardian objected to suit))).
44 See FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c); Brophy, 124 F.3d at 895 (“Unless . . . the court finds the
child’s general representative to be inadequate, it should not allow the general
representative to be bypassed by appointing a special representative . . . . Rule 17(c)
doesn’t say this . . . but it is implicit in the usual formulations of the court’s powers under
the rule . . . .”).
45 Brophy, 124 F.3d at 895. See infra Section I.C for discussion about how the terms
“next friend” and “guardian ad litem” are understood by courts.
46 Id.
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adult representatives share the same responsibility to make disinter-
ested decisions on behalf of child litigants.47
Courts interpreting Rule 17(c) have minimal guidance to rely
upon.48 “[T]he Supreme Court has never construed, interpreted, or
applied [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c)] in any opinion,”49 and
there is virtually no published legislative history to aid in courts’ inter-
pretation.50 Moreover, as the Rule fails to clarify whether federal or
state law governs determinations of who qualifies to serve as a repre-
sentative for child litigants under Rule 17(c) and what procedures are
required for their approval, courts vary in looking to state law, or
not.51 To this end, courts reach different conclusions as to whether the
47 See, e.g., In re Moore, 209 U.S. 490, 499 (1908) (holding that petitioning for a change
of venue falls within the discretion and authority accorded to next friends acting on behalf
of minors in litigation); 43 C.J.S. Infants § 426 (2019) (“It is the guardian ad litem’s duty to
stand in the shoes of the child and to weigh the factors as the child would weigh them if his
or her judgment were actually mature, and the minor was not in fact of tender years.”);
Moore, supra note 23, at 1846 (“[I]n litigation where the parent is bringing suit on behalf of
the child, the parent’s role as guardian, next friend, or guardian ad litem ordinarily
contemplates that the parent . . . will be making decisions on the child’s behalf, even
though it is the child who is the [lawyer’s] actual client . . . .”).
48 See Vroon v. Templin, 278 F.2d 345, 347 (4th Cir. 1960) (“It may be said that Rule 17
is lacking in complete clarity.”).
49 Gaddis v. United States, 381 F.3d 444, 452 (5th Cir. 2004) (footnote omitted).
50 Specifically, “[t]he only historical note in the published rules indicates that Rule
17(c) ‘is substantially former Equity Rule 70 (Suits by or Against Incompetents) with slight
additions.’” Id. at 452–53 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 17 advisory committee’s note to 1937
version). The author’s review of drafters’ memos from the initial drafting and subsequent
revisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure uncovered no substantive discussion of
the content of Rule 17(c) that would aid in its interpretation. Moreover, very little history
of the development or interpretation of Equity Rule 70, Rule 17’s predecessor, exists.
Indeed, a twenty-year retrospective of the Equity Rules concluded that Rule 70
“require[d] no comment.” Wallace R. Lane, Twenty Years Under the Federal Equity Rules,
46 HARV. L. REV. 638, 655 (1933); see also Wallace R. Lane, Federal Equity Rules, 35
HARV. L. REV. 276, 297 (1922) (citing no reported cases discussing Equity Rule 70 ten
years after its adoption).
51 Compare Developmental Disabilities Advocacy Ctr., Inc. v. Melton, 689 F.2d 281,
285–86 (1st Cir. 1982) (interpreting Rule 17(c)(1) according to New Hampshire law), and
Bergstreser v. Mitchell, 448 F. Supp. 10, 15 (E.D. Mo. 1977), aff’d, 577 F.2d 22 (8th Cir.
1978) (“Under Missouri law an infant may sue by its parent who is a natural guardian of
the child without the formality of having the parent appointed as next friend.” (citation
omitted)), with Fallat v. Gouran, 220 F.2d 325, 328 (3d Cir. 1955) (“Rule 17(c) . . .
apparently gives a guardian the right to sue in the federal courts irrespective of his capacity
under state law. From this it might be argued . . . that Rule 17(b) does not apply to
guardians but that their capacity to sue in the federal courts now stands solely on the basis
of federal law.”), and Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 26 F. Supp. 2d
1001, 1006 (W.D. Mich. 1998) (concluding, without reference to state law, that a parent is
“a general guardian” who may sue on behalf of a minor under Rule 17(c)(1)). See generally
6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 41, § 1571 (detailing how the lack of express language in
Rule 17(c) results in courts diverging in whether they interpret federal or state law when
applying the rule); Moore, supra note 23, at 1828–29 (“Absent unusual circumstances,
parents are entitled to bring lawsuits on behalf of their children. However, whether they do
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question of who can represent a child under Rule 17(c) is substantive
or procedural,52 and whether such “representatives” acting on behalf
of children are parties in the case whose capacity to represent a child
is governed by state law pursuant to Rule 17(b).53
so as general guardians or as next friends or guardians ad litem depends on the vagaries of
state law.” (citations omitted)).
52 See, e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bengtson, 231 F.2d 263, 265–66 (5th Cir. 1956)
(finding the court’s determination of who qualifies to represent a child litigant is
procedural and controlled by Federal Rule 17(c) and not by state law, which, in this case
would permit the claim to proceed only if brought by their father since their parents
divorced); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Callahan, 127 F.2d 32, 36 (10th Cir. 1942)
(explaining that “[h]ow appellee was required to proceed, in whose name the action must
be filed, is procedural,” and thus determined by federal law). See generally Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) (“[F]ederal courts are to apply state ‘substantive’ law and
federal ‘procedural’ law . . . .”); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“Except
in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be
applied in any case is the law of the State.”).
53 Rule 17(b) provides that the capacity of an individual “not acting in a representative
capacity” is determined “by the law of the individual’s domicile,” and that the capacity “for
all other parties” is determined “by the law of the state where the court is located.” FED. R.
CIV. P. 17(b) (emphasis added). Rule 17(c) makes no mention of state law and describes
“representatives” who may sue or defend on behalf of a minor. It is not clear whether the
“representatives” identified in Rule 17(c) are “other parties” for purposes of Rule 17(b),
or whether Rule 17(b) only governs those who qualify as “real parties in interest” under
Rule 17(a). FED. R. CIV. P. 17. Compare Chrissy F. ex rel. Medley v. Miss. Dep’t of Pub.
Welfare, 883 F.2d 25, 27 (5th Cir. 1989) (applying Rule 17(b) to determination of who
should represent a minor party under 17(c)), with Neilson v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 199
F.3d 642, 656 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that state law regarding who may represent a child in
the settlement of a child’s claim cannot restrict the federal court’s authority to appoint a
representative for a child under Rule 17(c)). See generally Vroon v. Templin, 278 F.2d 345,
347 (4th Cir. 1960) (summarizing opposing court views of whether state law governs the
determination of who can represent a child under 17(c)); 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note
41, § 1571 (describing various approaches taken by courts to reconcile Rules 17(b) and
17(c)). At least one court has held that parent guardians must bring an action in their own
names as real parties in interests when bringing suit on behalf of a child, but this conclusion
is uncommon. Ciarrocchi v. Clearview Reg’l High Sch. Dist., No. 09-2433 (NLH)(AMD),
2010 WL 2629050, at *2 (D.N.J. June 25, 2010) (dismissing father’s claim upon finding
mother to be child’s proper guardian, and stating that even were the father the proper
guardian, he would need to file the case in his name as the real party in interest and not in
the name of the minor child). Most courts hold that, whatever their designated role, as
representatives for their children, parents are nominal parties only and not real parties in
interest. See Morgan v. Potter, 157 U.S. 195, 198 (1895) (“The next friend, by whom the
suit is brought on behalf of the infant, is neither technically nor substantially the party, but
resembles an attorney, or a guardian ad litem, by whom a suit is brought or defended in
behalf of another.”); see also C.M.J. ex rel. D.L.J. v. Walt Disney Parks & Resorts US, Inc.,
No. 6:14-cv-1898-Orl-22GJK, 2017 WL 3065111, at *4 (M.D. Fla. July 19, 2017) (“The
guardian ad litem or next friend mentioned in Rule 17(c)(2) has always been deemed a
nominal party only, and the ward is the real party in interest.” (citation omitted)); Caban
ex rel. Crespo v. 600 E. 21st St. Co., 200 F.R.D. 176, 179–80 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (“Whether
suing as a natural guardian . . . , as a next friend, or as a court-appointed guardian ad litem,
the representative is a nominal party only; the action must be brought in the name of the
real party in interest—the infant.” (citation omitted)); J.G. WOERNER, A TREATISE ON
THE AMERICAN LAW OF GUARDIANSHIP OF MINORS AND PERSONS OF UNSOUND MIND
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Taken together with courts’ expansive view of their discretion,
these realities thwart the development of a clear, shared under-
standing of how Rule 17(c) applies to parents. Indeed, a survey of
federal claims brought on behalf of minors between 2015–2018 con-
firmed that parents are the adults who most often bring cases on
behalf of children, and it revealed that courts’ treatment of parent
representatives spanned a wide range, with courts identifying parents
as “guardians” in 21% of cases, “next friends” in 26% of cases,
“guardians ad litem” in 47% of cases, and failing to specify parents’
role in 6% of cases.54 Interestingly, court practices varied widely not
only among circuits but also within circuits, although trends
emerged.55 For example, courts in the Ninth Circuit were far more
likely than courts in other circuits to appoint parents as guardians ad
litem, whereas courts in the Eleventh Circuit more often treated par-
ents as next friends, and courts in the Third Circuit (although
reflecting a smaller sample size than the Ninth or Eleventh Circuits)
uniformly treated parents as guardians in all three cases identified.56
As discussed in Section I.D, these disparaties and the unpredictability
they generate harm parents, children, and courts themselves.
§ 58, at 188–91 (1897) (concluding that if a suit is for the sole use and benefit of the ward it
should be brought in the infant’s name; by contrast, if the suit involves a right belonging to
the guardian as guardian or damages resulting from his possession or contract regarding
the ward’s property it may be brought in the guardian’s name, and collecting cases holding
variously that a guardian should sue in the guardian’s name and that a guardian should sue
in the name of the ward).
54 Seventy-eight out of eighty-seven total cases brought on behalf of minors identified
by the author were brought by parents. Table: Cases 2015–2018, supra note 18.
55 See id.
56 Treatment of parents in a given case is categorized under a specific role (e.g., next
friend, guardian ad litem) if: The court found at least one parent appropriate for that role
or appointed at least one parent to that role; the court was prepared to allow at least one
parent to fill that role if further action was taken (e.g., the appropriate motion was filed or
the parent retained counsel); or the court assessed a parent’s appropriateness for that role,
even if the court appointed a non-parent to that role or another. The survey of cases
brought on behalf of minors in federal courts between 2015–2018 revealed the following
breakdown of court classifications of parents seeking to represent their children. First
Circuit: no cases identified; Second Circuit: five cases identified (guardian: 2; next friend: 2;
guardian ad litem: 1); Third Circuit: three cases identified (guardian: 3); Fourth Circuit: one
case identified (next friend: 1); Fifth Circuit: five cases identified (guardian: 2; next friend:
1; parent(s) not classified: 2); Sixth Circuit: three cases identified (guardian: 1; next friend:
2); Seventh Circuit: no cases identified; Eighth Circuit: two cases identified (guardian: 1;
parent(s) not classified: 1—although the court in this case suggested that the parent could
seek to qualify as a guardian or next friend); Ninth Circuit: forty-two cases identified
(guardian: 4; next friend: 2; guardian ad litem: 35; parent(s) not classified: 1); Tenth Circuit:
four cases identified (guardian: 1; next friend: 2; parent(s) not classified: 1); Eleventh
Circuit: eleven cases identified (guardian: 2; next friend: 8—these eight cases had related
claims, were filed in the same court, and involved the same counsel; guardian ad litem: 1);
D.C. Circuit: two cases identified (next friend: 2). Table: Cases 2015–2018, supra note 18.
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B. Parents and General Representatives
Rule 17(c)(1) explicitly authorizes certain general representa-
tives, including “general guardians,” “committees,” “conservators,”
and other “like fiduciaries” of a minor child to sue and defend on the
child’s behalf without court approval.57 Thus, if a qualifying general
representative appears on behalf of a child in a case, Rule 17(c)(1)
presumes that the representative should be permitted to proceed and
no further court action to protect a child is required (absent evidence
of harm or a conflict of interests).58 Courts frequently recognize that
general representatives should not be sidelined in their ongoing deci-
sionmaking role for a child through the appointment of a special rep-
resentative in a particular case.59
A critical question left unanswered by Rule 17(c) is whether par-
ents qualify as such general representatives.60 Although parents and
other legal custodians have decisionmaking authority in children’s
daily lives,61 parents are not expressly listed in Rule 17(c)(1), and
courts disagree as to whether parents fit within one of the qualifying
57 FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c)(1). The full text reads: “(1) With a Representative. The
following representatives may sue or defend on behalf of a minor or an incompetent
person: (A) a general guardian; (B) a committee; (C) a conservator; or (D) a like
fiduciary.”
58 T.W. ex rel. Enk v. Brophy, 124 F.3d 893, 895 (7th Cir. 1997) (“If the general
representative has a conflict of interest (for example because he is . . . the defendant in the
child’s suit), or fails without reason to sue or defend . . . , the child may with the court’s
permission sue by another next friend, or the court may appoint a guardian ad litem . . . .”
(citation omitted)); see also Ad Hoc Comm. of Concerned Teachers ex rel. Minor &
Under-Age Students Attending Greenburgh Eleven Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Greenburgh
No. 11 Union Free Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d 25, 29 (2d Cir. 1989) (“Rule 17(c) has always been
viewed as permissive and not mandatory. It gives a federal court power to authorize
someone other than a lawful representative to sue on behalf of an infant or incompetent
person where that representative is unable, unwilling or refuses to act or has [conflicting]
interests . . . .”); Garrick v. Weaver, 888 F.2d 687, 693 (10th Cir. 1989) (“When the court
determines that the interests of the infant and the infant’s legal representative diverge,
appointment of a guardian ad litem is appropriate.” (citing Noe v. True, 507 F.2d 9, 11–12
(6th Cir. 1974))); Chrissy F. ex rel. Medley v. Miss. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 883 F.2d 25, 27
(5th Cir. 1989) (“[W]hen the complaint shows a conflict of interest between a general
guardian and an infant, the court should, on its own motion, determine whether the
infant’s interests are adequately protected by the general guardian’s representation.”
(citation omitted)).
59 See, e.g., Brophy, 124 F.3d at 895 (“Unless . . . the court finds the child’s general
representative to be inadequate, it should not allow the general representative to be
bypassed by appointing a special representative . . . . Rule 17(c) doesn’t say this . . . , but it
is implicit in the usual formulations of the court’s powers under the rule.”). But see von
Bulow ex rel. Auersperg v. von Bulow, 634 F. Supp. 1284, 1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (“[C]ourts
have repeatedly affirmed the power of the court to determine that the interests of a child
or incompetent would best be represented not by a general representative, such as parent
or guardian, but by a guardian ad litem or ‘next friend.’” (citation omitted)).
60 See von Bulow, 634 F. Supp. at 1293 (identifying parents as general representatives).
61 See supra notes 5–12 and accompanying text.
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categories. Specifically, courts disagree as to whether parents qualify
as “general guardian[s],” “like fiduciar[ies],” or do not qualify as any
form of general representative at all.62 Because the question of par-
ents as general representatives remains unsettled, parents generally
lack the assurance that they will be entitled to represent their chil-
dren’s interests without further court scrutiny or process under Rule
17(c)(1).
The variety in courts’ understanding of the term “general
guardian” accords with its disparate meanings within guardianship law
itself. In common parlance, the term “guardian” often refers to an
adult who has been court-appointed to serve as the legal representa-
tive for a child whose parents are unable to do so, but parents are
guardians as well.63 Guardianship law historically has divided guard-
ians into several categories according to the duration, scope, and con-
tent of their authority. With regard to the duration and scope of their
authority, general guardians act “for all purposes and over a period of
time,” whereas special guardians are appointed for a limited purpose
and/or a limited time.64 Moreover, some authorities recognize the
term “general guardian” as a specialized term “applied, mostly, to
guardians appointed by probate or testamentary courts to distinguish
them” from other types of guardians.65
With regard to the content of their authority, guardians of the
person have custody of a child and are responsible for the child’s edu-
cation and support, and entitled to their earnings,66 whereas guardians
of the estate are “responsible for the care, management, protection
and investment” of a child’s tangible and intangible property.67 These
content divisions have inauspicious roots in feudal traditions and the
historic legal infantilization of women.68 Court-appointed guardians
62 FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c)(1).
63 Peter Mosanyi II, Comment, A Survey of State Guardianship Statutes: One Concept,
Many Applications, 18 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 253, 253–54 (2002); WOERNER, supra
note 53, § 14, at 39 (“Guardian . . . is the generic term applied, in legal usage, to a person
whose right and duty it is to protect the rights, whether of person or property, of some
other person . . . incompetent to manage his affairs.”).
64 1 HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES § 9.4, at 560 (practitioner’s ed., 2d ed. 1987).
65 WOERNER, supra note 53, § 24, at 76.
66 CLARK, supra note 64, § 9.4, at 557; WOERNER, supra note 53, § 8, at 21–22.
67 See CLARK, supra note 64, § 9.4, at 558; Deirdre M. Smith, Keeping It in the Family:
Minor Guardianship as Private Child Protection, 18 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 271, 280 (2019)
(noting that historically, the key task of guardians of the estate was to “ensure that the
minor was able to enjoy, control, and dispose of their property,” thus preserving the
economic benefits of the property for the family during the child’s minority).
68 Under feudal traditions, the lord in chivalry had exclusive authority over the estate;
until the twentieth century, American law denied women full legal status and thereby
precluded women and mothers from taking legal action on behalf of themselves and their
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exercise authority only over those concerns specifically designated by
the court.69
Parents occupy a singular place in guardianship law, which strad-
dles these divides. The law refers to parents as the “natural guardians”
of their children, with authority deriving from their relationship rather
than court order.70 Common law traditionally conferred parents, as
“natural” guardians, with the custody of their children and the respon-
sibility to provide for their children’s care, education, and support, but
it did not confer parents with authority over children’s property.71
Thus, common law historically treated parents as guardians of the per-
sons of their children but not of their estates.72 Within these spheres,
the classification of legal claims as elements of “property manage-
children. WILLIAM MACPHERSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW RELATING TO INFANTS 52–54,
57 (1843); Smith, supra note 67, at 278–79 (“Minors most commonly owned property
because they had inherited it from their deceased fathers, so the children most in need of
an appointed guardian were also legal orphans. (A fatherless child was considered an
orphan because their mother had limited standing and rights.)” (footnote omitted)); see
also WOERNER, supra note 53, § 19, at 53 (explaining that a father’s right to natural
guardianship “is paramount to that of the mother, unless adjudged to be unfit or
incompetent, in all the States except Iowa, Kansas, and Nebraska”).
69 See 39 AM. JUR. 2d Guardian & Ward § 1.
70 See CLARK, supra note 64, § 9.4, at 557. Although this historic terminology stems
from the relationship between biological parents and their children, adoptive parents and
parents who have children using assisted reproductive technology also enjoy rights as
children’s legal parents, while some biological parents such as unmarried fathers may not
be legally recognized until they take legal action. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn,
Parents, Babies, and More Parents, 92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 9, 14–15 (2017) (identifying legal
parents as “those adults upon whom the law confers recognition, imposes financial
obligations, and grants standing to seek visitation and custody,” and identifying several
sources of legal parenthood: biology, function, and formalities (such as adoption)); Clare
Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal Structure for Nonmarital Families, 67 STAN.
L. REV. 167, 203–05 (2015) (evaluating the legal rights of unmarried fathers); cf. Pavan v.
Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2077–79 (2017) (holding that Arkansas must recognize the legal
parentage of same-sex spouses whose children are born during their marriage (by whatever
reproductive means) to the same extent as opposite-sex spouses whose children are born
during their marriage, even if the same-sex spouse lacks a biological tie to the child); V.L.
v. E.L., 136 S. Ct. 1017, 1019–22 (2016) (holding Alabama must give full faith and credit to
a Georgia adoption decree conferring legal parenthood on the same-sex spouse of a child’s
biological mother). See generally Douglas NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE
L.J. 2260 (2017) (exploring contemporary permutations of parenthood facilitated by
assisted reproductive technologies and arguing for a reorientation of parentage law to
emphasize parents’ social contributions over their biological contributions).
71 WOERNER, supra note 53, § 14, at 40 (“But the authority of parents as guardians by
nature extends only to the person of their child; they have no power, as such, over
property, whether real or personal.”); id. at 55; Annotation, Right of Natural Guardian to
Custody or Control of Infant’s Property, 6 A.L.R. 115 (1920).
72 This synergy is further reflected in doctrine providing that the guardian of an infant’s
person “stands in loco parentis.” In re Bagley’s Guardianship, 233 N.W. 563, 565 (Wis.
1930); WOERNER, supra note 53, § 14, at 39 (“In respect to minors, the guardian of the
person stands in loco parentis . . . .”).
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ment” or “care” creates another source of ambiguity. Some commen-
tators and courts have concluded that the common law categorizes
legal claims wholesale as property interests (whether inchoate or real-
ized), which fall under the exclusive purview of guardians of the
estate, and outside the authority of parents.73 Yet, this generalization
overlooks the nuance in how courts historically have treated the legal
claims of minors in practice.74 The management of legal claims related
to a child’s sole and separate estate have been understood as within
the property-management authority of guardians of the estate.75 But
courts historically turned to parents as natural guardians and chil-
dren’s closest relatives to advance children’s legal claims under a wide
variety of circumstances, including: where a child lacks an appointed
guardian of the estate, where a child’s claims are unrelated to the
child’s estate, and where claims relate to the portion of a child’s estate
derived from the parent.76
73 See Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Volpe, 284 F. 75, 79–80 (3d Cir. 1922) (“The father, as
the natural guardian of the person of his child, during infancy, has, by virtue of such
relationship, no authority whatever to exercise any control over the estate of the minor. He
cannot release or compromise a suit prosecuted on behalf of the minor.”); CLARK, supra
note 64, § 9.4, at 557, 559 (“Where a minor is a party to a suit, it is generally required that
the court appoint a guardian ad litem to represent him, unless he already has a guardian of
the estate, in which case that guardian may represent him.”); cf. Tulsa Prof’l Collection
Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 485 (1988) (holding that a cause of action is an intangible
property interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment);
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 429–30 (1982) (analyzing underpinnings of
classification of legal claims as property under the Due Process Clauses of the
Constitution).
74 Indeed, one late-nineteenth-century commentator asserted that historically, under
common law, “infants sue and defend by guardian,—not the guardian of the person and
estate, but either one admitted by the court for the particular suit, or appointed for suits in
general by the king’s letters patent.” WOERNER, supra note 53, § 58, at 188.
75 One commentator suggested that actions brought by guardians of the estate
regarding property or actions taken under the guardian’s authority may be brought in the
name of the guardian, but all other suits for the ward’s benefit should be in the name of the
ward by the guardian or next friend. Id. at 188–89.
76 In doing so, courts historically also varied in identifying parents as guardians, next
friends, or guardians ad litem under the common law. Compare WILLIAM MACPHERSON, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW RELATING TO INFANTS 363–64 (1843) (“When . . . an infant claims
a right, or suffers an injury . . . his nearest relative is supposed to be the person who will . . .
institute a suit to assert his rights or to vindicate his wrongs; and . . . is, therefore, termed
his next friend.”) and id. at 396 (noting that in suits in equity against an infant, “the court
appoints a guardian to conduct his defence, who is usually his nearest relative . . . . This
person is called guardian ad litem; his duties are limited to the particular suit, and he has
none of the powers or liabilities of a permanent guardian”), with WOERNER, supra note 53,
§ 19, at 55 & n.8 (citing Rhoades v. McNulty, 52 Mo. App. 301, 306 (1893)) (“[T]he father,
as natural guardian, may sue for and recover personal property of his minor son which
came to the son through himself. In such case he should describe himself as guardian.”),
and id. at 183 (“Demand made by the natural guardian for the property of his minor child
was held, in the absence of a legally appointed guardian, sufficient as a demand . . . by next
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State guardianship statutes uniformly adopt the common law’s
tradition of recognizing parents as legal guardians of their children,
with “exclusive rights to care, custody, and control along with respon-
sibility to support the child.”77 States have modified the common law’s
classic demarcation in parental authority to varying extents, with some
maintaining the traditional distinction and according parents no
authority over a child’s property absent court-appointment as
guardian of the child’s estate,78 and others granting parents authority
over both a child’s person and a child’s estate.79
Although parents typically are guardians of their children, it is
unclear whether parents qualify as general guardians under Rule
17(c)(1). Because parental authority extends beyond the bounds of a
particular case in time and scope, parents are general representatives.
But as parental authority may be limited to a child’s person, parents
could be viewed as different than general guardians who exercise
authority over both a child’s person and a child’s estate. Rule 17(c)(1)
does not define “general guardian,” and the legislative history pro-
vides no insight into what the drafters of Rule 17 thought it meant.80
Against this backdrop, federal courts vary widely as to whether
parents qualify to represent their children under Rule 17(c)(1). Some
courts identify parents as “general representative[s].”81 Others recog-
friend, and in an early Maryland case the natural guardian was allowed to maintain the
action.” (citations omitted)).
77 Mosanyi, supra note 63, at 254.
78 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-629(b) (West 1999) (stating that courts may grant
parents authority over a minor’s estate if no guardian of the estate exists); 20 PA. STAT.
AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5102 (West 1972) (stating that court may authorize or direct the
parent to execute transactions of personal property while acting in best interest of the
minor).
79 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.301 (West 2015) (stating that parents are natural
guardians of their children during minority and can control their children’s property, so
long as it does not exceed $15,000, without appointment); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-3053
(West 2002) (stating that a natural guardian retains the right to exercise control over the
minor’s person as well as the responsibility to manage their estate, unless a guardian or
conservator has been appointed); MO. ANN. STAT. § 475.025 (West 1957) (stating that
parents are natural guardians of their child’s person, and that when the minor’s estate is
derived from the parent, the natural guardian has the same powers as a conservator
without needing appointment or authorization from the court); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2111.08 (West 1990) (stating that parents are joint natural guardians charged with their
children’s care, welfare, and management of their estates); TEX. EST. CODE ANN.
§ 1104.051 (West 2014) (stating that parents serve as natural guardians of minor children
by the marriage, with one parent entitled to be appointed guardian of the children’s
estate); see also Irby v. Dowdy, 213 S.W. 739, 740 (Ark. 1919) (noting that under Arkansas
law, “the natural guardian shall have the custody and care of minor children and their
estates”).
80 FED. R. CIV. P. 17 advisory committee’s note to 1937 version.
81 von Bulow ex rel. Auersperg v. von Bulow, 634 F. Supp. 1284, 1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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nize parents as “general guardian[s].”82 Other courts treat parents as
next friends, guardians ad litem, or as uncategorized “other represen-
tatives,” with little analysis supporting their conclusions.83 Some
courts recognize parents as general representatives but appoint them
as next friends anyway.84 Some courts rely on state law in determining
whether parents qualify as general guardians.85 Others rely solely on
the conclusions of other federal courts or cite no authority in support
of their holding.86 By contrast, at least one court found that parents
qualify under Rule 17(c)(1) not as “general guardians,” but as “like
fiduciaries.”87 Courts also disagree whether a general representative
82 Fonseca v. Kaiser Permanente Med. Ctr. Roseville, 222 F. Supp. 3d 850, 860 (E.D.
Cal. 2016) (“Given Ms. Fonseca’s status as Israel’s mother and general guardian, she may
litigate here on his behalf.”); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Remington, No. 2:12-cv-02821-
GEB-CMK, 2013 WL 3070629, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 17, 2013) (denying as moot a mother’s
motion for appointment as guardian ad litem “in light of the authority [she] has under Rule
17(c)(1)(A) to represent [plaintiff] as [plaintiff’s] general guardian”); Williams v. Monroe
Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 07-0561-CG-B, 2009 WL 1767658, at *4 (S.D. Ala. June 23, 2009);
Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 26 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1006 (W.D.
Mich. 1998) (holding that a parent is a “general guardian” who may sue on behalf of a
minor under Rule 17(c)(1)); see also Croce v. Bromley Corp., 623 F.2d 1084, 1093 (5th Cir.
1980) (finding a mother entitled to bring suit as legal guardian); Smogonovich v. City of
Boise, No. 09-011-S-EJL, 2009 WL 3229371, at *3 (D. Idaho June 23, 2009).
83 See infra Section I.C (explaining and distinguishing courts’ use of the terms “next
friend” and “guardian ad litem”).
84 T.W. ex rel. Enk v. Brophy, 124 F.3d 893, 895 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Just to add to the
confusion, when the child does have a general representative, the representative will
usually be designated as the child’s ‘next friend,’ despite the wording of Rule 17(c) . . . .”);
Doe v. Carnival Corp., 37 F. Supp. 3d 1254, 1258 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (“There is a certain
fluidity in the relationship between the provisions of Rule 17(c)(1) and Rule 17(c)(2), in
the sense that one who qualifies as a ‘general guardian’ may also be appointed as a ‘next
friend’ under Rule 17(c)(2).”).
85 See, e.g., Gibbs ex rel. Gibbs v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 314 F.3d 125, 129 (3d Cir.
2002) (“The first step of the Rule 17 inquiry is to look to the law of the minor’s domicile to
see if the minor already has a legal representative appointed for him.”); Bergstreser v.
Mitchell, 448 F. Supp. 10, 15 (E.D. Mo. 1977) (“Under Missouri law an infant may sue by
its parent who is a natural guardian of the child without the formality of having the parent
appointed as next friend.”), aff’d, 577 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1978); see also Brophy, 124 F.3d at
896 (stating that state law should control the determination of who qualifies as a general
representative for a child “because the management of the affairs of infants, like other
matters relating to domestic relations, is the primary responsibility of the states rather than
of the federal government”).
86 See, e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bengtson, 231 F.2d 263, 265–66 (5th Cir. 1956)
(holding that federal procedure governs determination of adult capacity to represent a
child’s interests in federal court, and declining to apply Louisiana state law); Fonseca, 222
F. Supp. 3d at 860 (citing Rule 17(c) and one federal case to support classification of
parents as general guardians); Cmtys. for Equity, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 1006 (concluding
without reference to state law that a parent is a “general guardian” who may sue on behalf
of a minor under Rule 17(c)(1)).
87 Developmental Disabilities Advocacy Ctr., Inc. v. Melton, 689 F.2d 281, 285–86 (1st
Cir. 1982).
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must be court-appointed to qualify to serve under Rule 17(c)(1) in
light of the Rule’s reference to court appointment in 17(c)(2).88
In sum, because courts treat parents so differently, parents cannot
be sure whether they will be treated as general representatives by the
courts. Thus, parents cannot rest assured that they will benefit from
Rule 17(c)(1)’s presumption that general representatives should
represent children’s interests. Instead, whether a parent qualifies as a
general representative in a particular court is a case-by-case determi-
nation that is perhaps, but not necessarily, informed by the scope of
authority granted to parents as guardians under the law of the forum
state. Notable across these disparate court-made rules is the complete
absence of constitutional law analysis of parents’ protected decision-
making rights.
C. Parents and Special Representatives
If courts fail to recognize parents as general representatives
under Rule 17(c)(1), parents must seek approval to represent their
children’s interests as special representatives within a particular case.
Rule 17(c)(2) permits a child who has no appropriate general repre-
sentative89 (and, according to some courts, a child who has no such
duly appointed general representative)90 to be represented by a next
friend or guardian ad litem.91 Next friends and guardians ad litem are
special representatives for child litigants, meaning that they represent
the child’s interests solely in the context of the particular litigation in
88 Compare Carnival Corp., 37 F. Supp. 3d at 1257–58 (“[T]he applicable federal rule
explicitly envisions a court ‘appoint[ment]’ of a guardian ad litem in Federal Rule 17(c)(2),
but does not specify in Rule 17(c)(1) whether or when a ‘general guardian’ must be
appointed as representative, by the court or otherwise.”), with Developmental Disabilities
Advocacy Ctr., Inc., 689 F.2d at 285–86 (holding a parent is a “like fiduciary” who can
bring a claim on behalf of a child under Rule 17(c)(1), but since a parent is not a court-
appointed representative, the court retains the power to appoint a next friend or guardian
ad litem if it chooses), and Cmtys. for Equity, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 1006 (holding that a parent
not appointed guardian by a court is a “general guardian” who may sue on behalf of a
minor under Rule 17(c)(1)). Although Rule 17(c)(1) says nothing about appointment, Rule
17(c)(2) provides that “[a] minor or an incompetent person who does not have a duly
appointed representative may sue by a next friend or by a guardian ad litem.” FED. R. CIV.
P. 17(c) (emphasis added).
89 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 41, § 1570, at 665 (“As a general rule, a federal court
cannot appoint a guardian ad litem in an action in which the infant or incompetent already
is represented by someone who is considered appropriate under the law of the forum
state.”).
90 See Developmental Disabilities Advocacy Ctr., Inc., 689 F.2d at 285–86.
91 FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c). Rather than viewing parents as general representatives, next
friends, or guardians ad litem, some courts conclude that children are “otherwise
represented” by their parents, and thus hold that guardian ad litem appointment is
unnecessary. See infra Section I.C.
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which they are designated.92 Historically, courts described the terms
“next friends” and “guardians ad litem” as essentially synonymous,93
differing primarily in that next friends represented the interests of
minor plaintiffs, whereas guardians ad litem represented the interests
of minor defendants.94 Today, in practice, although the roles played by
next friends and guardians ad litem are similar, next friends typically
initiate litigation on behalf of children of their own volition, whereas
guardians ad litem typically are appointed by courts to represent chil-
dren who lack appropriate legal representatives in an ongoing case.95
As with general representatives, courts differ widely with regard
to their understanding of the processes and qualifications for special
representatives, of how parents fit within them, and of whether par-
ents should have any priority to serve. Because parents must seek
court approval to proceed as special representatives, parents face the
possibility that they may be rejected by courts, and supplanted by
another representative preferred by the court. This possibility is
amplified by courts’ consistent failure to consider parents’ constitu-
tionally protected decisionmaking authority when evaluating whether
a parent or another individual should serve as a child’s special repre-
sentative within an ongoing case.
1. Parents and Next Friends
A “next friend” typically voluntarily “appears in a lawsuit to act
for the benefit of an incompetent or minor plaintiff,” without being
appointed as guardian or recognized as a party.96 Rule 17(c)(2) pro-
92 See Sam M. ex rel. Elliott v. Carcieri, 608 F.3d 77, 87 (1st Cir. 2010) (stating that the
appointment of a guardian ad litem in state family court proceedings does not preclude a
different next friend from initiating federal litigation); Noe v. True, 507 F.2d 9, 12 (6th Cir.
1974) (“[A]n appointed guardian ad litem does not replace a general guardian for all
purposes, but is ‘appointed as a representative of the court to act for the minor in the
cause . . . .’” (quoting Fong Sik Leung v. Dulles, 226 F.2d 74, 82 (9th Cir. 1955) (Boldt, J.,
concurring))).
93 See, e.g., Till v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 124 F.2d 405, 408 (10th Cir. 1941)
(“There is little distinction between a next friend and a guardian ad litem.”); von Bulow ex
rel. Auersperg v. von Bulow, 634 F. Supp. 1284, 1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (“[T]here is no
substantial difference between a ‘guardian ad litem’ and a ‘next friend.’”); see also
Blackwell v. Vance Trucking Co., 139 F. Supp. 103, 106 (E.D.S.C. 1956).
94 T.W. ex rel. Enk v. Brophy, 124 F.3d 893, 895 (7th Cir. 1997) (“The terms are
essentially interchangeable, but ‘next friend’ is normally used when the child is the
plaintiff, and ‘guardian ad litem’ when the child is the defendant.”); see also Franz v.
Buder, 38 F.2d 605 (8th Cir. 1930) (describing guardian ad litem practice under Equity
Rule 70, which preceded Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c)).
95 See infra Sections I.C.1–2.
96 Next Friend, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also Morgan v. Potter,
157 U.S. 195, 198 (1895) (“The next friend, by whom the suit is brought on behalf of the
infant, is neither technically nor substantially the party, but resembles an attorney, or a
guardian ad litem, by whom a suit is brought or defended in behalf of another.”).
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vides that children who lack a duly appointed representative may
appear by a next friend, but neither establishes qualifications for next
friends nor clarifies what, if any, steps a prospective next friend must
take to participate in a particular case.97 Lacking clear guidance, court
practices regarding next friends vary.98 Consequently, a parent
seeking to serve as a child’s next friend faces uncertainty in the
processes and qualifications required to proceed in the role.
First, courts diverge with regard to the process for becoming a
next friend. Some courts conclude that no process is required—an
individual becomes a next friend simply by acting as one.99 Others
hold that next friends must be appointed by the federal court before
whom they appear.100 Still others recognize both of these paths as
legitimate.101 Finally, at least one court suggests that individuals must
be appointed the next friend of a child by some other authority (pre-
sumably, state courts) before they can serve in the federal case.102
Regardless of whether court appointment is required as an initial
matter, courts uniformly agree that courts retain the power to scruti-
nize the suitability of an individual to serve as a next friend.103 But
court practices differ significantly in determining who qualifies to
serve.104 The standard most often applied (where one is applied at all)
97 FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c)(2).
98 See Sam M. ex rel. Elliott v. Carcieri, 608 F.3d 77, 90 (1st Cir. 2010) (“Rule 17(c)
recognizes that an individual may represent the real party in interest as a Next Friend but it
offers no clear guidance regarding who may proceed as a Next Friend.”); Brophy, 124 F.3d
at 897 (noting “the almost complete lack of authority on the question” of who may serve as
a next friend).
99 Brophy, 124 F.3d at 895 (“The court does not usually appoint a next friend; it is
usually the next friend who has taken the initiative in suing on the child’s behalf . . . .”).
100 Ad Hoc Comm. of Concerned Teachers ex rel. Minor & Under-Age Students
Attending Greenburgh Eleven Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Greenburgh No. 11 Union Free
Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d 25, 30–31 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating that “a court should conduct an
inquiry into the application of any adult” seeking next friend status).
101 Ingram ex rel. Ingram v. Ainsworth, 184 F.R.D. 90, 92 (S.D. Miss. 1999) (“The
district court is authorized to appoint a next friend or to allow a self-appointed individual
to serve as a next friend in order to protect the interests of the incompetent party.” (citing
Adelman ex rel. Adelman v. Graves, 747 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1984))).
102 Hafez v. Madison, No. 2:08-CV-0156-RWS, 2008 WL 4181328, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Sept.
8, 2008) (“[T]o proceed on his claims against Defendant . . . regarding the placement of his
children in foster care, Plaintiff must submit documentation to the Court establishing that
he is entitled to serve in this lawsuit as his minor children’s guardian or next friend and that
he has retained counsel on their behalf.”).
103 Brophy, 124 F.3d at 895 (“[A]ppointed or not, [a next friend] can be challenged as
not being a suitable representative, just as a guardian ad litem can be.”).
104 Compare Genesco, Inc. v. Cone Mills Corp., 604 F.2d 281, 285 (4th Cir. 1979) (“[N]o
special appointment process for the next friend is required.”), and In re Murray, 199 B.R.
165, 173 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1996) (noting that no “appointment or qualification
procedure” is required to file a next friend petition), with Sam M. ex rel. Elliott v. Carcieri,
608 F.3d 77, 90 (1st Cir. 2010) (“Next Friend capacity is not lightly granted to any
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provides that “[t]he burden is on the ‘next friend’ clearly to establish
the propriety of his status and thereby justify the jurisdiction of the
court.”105 To do so, next friends must prove: (1) the real party in
interest (the child litigant) cannot represent himself or herself, (2) the
next friend is “truly dedicated to the best interests” of the child,106
and, in some courts, (3) the next friend has a “significant relationship”
with the child.107
individual who petitions a federal court to pursue an action on behalf of another.”), and
Rawlings v. Littleton, 23 F.3d 408 (6th Cir. 1994) (“We note that a parent, if appointed next
friend, could sue on her minor child’s behalf. . . . However, there is no indication from the
record that Rawlings was appointed next friend in this case.” (citing Rule 17(c))), and
Brophy, 124 F.3d at 895 (“Yet even if the child’s existing representative is in fact
inadequate, another next friend can’t jump into the case without first obtaining a court
order disqualifying the existing representative from representing the child in the suit.”),
and Hafez, 2008 WL 4181328, at *5 (requiring plaintiff to submit documentation to the
Court to establish his entitlement to next friend status). See also 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 41, § 1572, at 683–84 (“There are no special requirements for the person suing as next
friend.”).
105 Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 164 (1990). The standard was initially
articulated by the Supreme Court in the context of habeas corpus petitions and has been
extended to cases brought on behalf of children by lower courts with some variation. See
Gonzalez ex rel. Gonzalez v. Reno, 86 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1184–85 (S.D. Fla.) (describing
origins of the standard), aff’d sub nom. Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2000).
The Supreme Court’s language in Whitmore suggests that application beyond the habeas
context is appropriate. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 164–65 (“[W]e think the scope of any federal
doctrine of ‘next friend’ standing is no broader than what is permitted by the habeas
corpus statute, which codified the historical practice.”).
106 Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163.
107 See, e.g., Brophy, 124 F.3d at 897; Tinsley v. Flanagan, No. CV-15-00185-PHX-ROS,
2016 WL 8200450, at *4 (D. Ariz. May 13, 2016). Courts disagree on whether the
“significant relationship” prong was established as a separate, third requirement or just a
consideration in evaluating the second prong of the test. See, e.g., Sam M., 608 F.3d at 90
(holding that the “significant relationship” prong is not “a necessary prerequisite”); Coal.
of Clergy, Lawyers, & Professors v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153, 1162 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding the
“significant relationship” prong is required but noting its “contours . . . do not remain
static” in the habeas context); Ford v. Haley, 195 F.3d 603, 624 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding
that a would-be next friend “must show some relationship or other evidence that
demonstrates the next friend is truly dedicated” to the party’s interests (emphasis added));
Brophy, 124 F.3d at 897 (noting that Whitmore “suggest[s]” that a next friend must have a
significant relationship with a plaintiff); Peter L. v. Rollins, No. 00-129-M, 2001 WL
1669253, at *4 (D.N.H. Dec. 19, 2001) (treating the “significant relationship” prong as a
third and necessary requirement). Some courts have continued to recognize the third
prong post-Whitmore in the habeas context as well. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598,
604 (4th Cir. 2002). Some courts appear to read further into dicta from the habeas context
a requirement that next friends for child litigants must be lawyers. See Rodgers v. Dallas
Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 3-07-CV-0386-P, 2007 WL 1686508, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 1, 2007);
Martin v. Revere Smelting & Ref. Corp., No. 3:03-CV-2589-D, 2004 WL 852354, at *1–2
(N.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 2004). This seems to be a misinterpretation of an admonishment by the
Fifth Circuit that the next friend process should not be misused by career next friends to
subvert rules against the unauthorized practice of law. Weber ex rel. Zimmerman v. Garza,
570 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir. 1978) (“[I]ndividuals not licensed to practice law by the state
may not use the ‘next friend’ device as an artifice for the unauthorized practice of law.”).
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The first requirement is easily satisfied in the case of child liti-
gants because of their legal incapacity.108 In determining whether a
next friend is “truly dedicated” to the child’s best interests, courts
have considered a variety of factors depending on the circumstances
of the case, including: “the individual’s familiarity with the litigation,
the reasons that move her to pursue the litigation, and her ability to
pursue the case on the child’s behalf,”109 that the individual “has
embraced the responsibility of prosecuting the instant case,” and that
the individual “has cared for [the child] in his own home.”110
Courts that recognize the third requirement vary as to what con-
stitutes a sufficiently “significant relationship” to qualify for service as
a next friend. Several circuits conclude that the determination
depends on the circumstances of the child and should be interpreted
flexibly to ensure that children can access the courts.111 Under this
reasoning, if a child has a “significant relationship” with one or more
adults, the next friend should be one of those adults, such as a close
relative, a personal friend of the child or the child’s family, or “a pro-
fessional who has worked with the child.”112 If a child lacks a “signifi-
cant relationship” with any adult, as, for example, many foster
children do, then an individual with only some or even little to no
relationship with a child may be permitted to serve.113 In such cases,
courts may require the putative next friend to demonstrate that he or
she has a good faith interest in pursuing the claim,114 is motivated “by
a sincere desire to seek justice on the infant’s behalf,”115 or has some
relationship “conveying some modicum of authority or consent, ‘sig-
Indeed, the persistence of the common law mandate that next friends advancing children’s
claims must retain counsel and cannot proceed pro se contradicts the idea that a law
license is required for service as a next friend. See generally Martin, No Right to Counsel,
supra note 18 (evaluating federal doctrine requiring that children’s civil claims be
advanced by adult representatives and counsel).
108 Tinsley, 2016 WL 8200450, at *4.
109 Sam M., 608 F.3d at 92.
110 Gonzalez, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 1186.
111 Sam M., 608 F.3d at 90–91 (evaluating cases).
112 Brophy, 124 F.3d at 897.
113 See Sam M., 608 F.3d at 91 (“In evaluating an individual’s capacity to serve as Next
Friend for minors who lack ties with their parents and family members, federal courts have
rejected a rigid application of the significant relationship requirement . . . .”); Brophy, 124
F.3d at 897 (holding that “in desperate circumstances,” a court could appoint “a stranger
whom the court finds to be especially suitable to represent the child’s interests in the
litigation” as next friend); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598, 604 n.3 (4th Cir. 2002)
(noting in the habeas context that a significant relationship may not be required if a
detainee has no significant relationships).
114 Sam M., 608 F.3d at 91–92.
115 Ad Hoc Comm. of Concerned Teachers ex rel. Minor & Under-Age Students
Attending Greenburgh Eleven Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Greenburgh No. 11 Union Free
Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d 25, 30–31 (2d Cir. 1989).
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nificant’ in comparison to the detainee’s other relationships.”116
Together, these limitations are intended to prevent “intruders or unin-
vited meddlers”117 and individuals motivated by personal political ide-
ology alone from advancing litigation ostensibly on behalf of others as
next friends.118 Courts not applying this three-pronged test assess pro-
spective next friends based on similar factors, including: the existence
of an actual or potential conflict of interests,119 whether the individual
is acting in good faith and interested in the child’s welfare,120 and
whether the individual can adequately represent the child121 and pros-
ecute the case.122
Many courts treat parents seeking to represent their children in
litigation as next friends.123 Although the common factors applied by
courts in assessing the propriety of next friends favor parents, courts
vary as to whether parents should be prioritized for this role.124 In
considering parents as prospective next friends, courts uniformly fail
to account for parents’ protected decisionmaking authority. Instead,
116 See Coal. of Clergy, Lawyers, & Professors v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153, 1162 (9th Cir.
2002) (holding that a coalition of professionals who had “not demonstrated any
relationship with the detainees” lacked standing as next friends in a habeas case); see also
Sam M., 608 F.3d at 92–94 (permitting a former foster parent, a school psychologist, and a
sociology professor who focused on child maltreatment to serve as next friends for foster
children).
117 United States ex rel. Bryant v. Houston, 273 F. 915, 916 (2d Cir. 1921).
118 See Brophy, 124 F.3d at 897 (“[N]ot just anyone who expresses an interest in the
subject matter of a suit is eligible to be the plaintiff’s next friend . . . .”); see also Tinsley v.
Flanagan, No. CV-15-00185-PHX-ROS, 2016 WL 8200450, at *4 (D. Ariz. May 13, 2016)
(noting the difficulty of identifying those next friends motivated by purely ideological
interests).
119 See Ballard v. Johnson, No. 15-11039, 2017 WL 1151166, at *5–6 (E.D. Mich. Mar.
28, 2017) (declining to appoint former foster mother as next friend because she was an
interested party in the litigation and sought monetary damages for herself and the
children).
120 See Greenburgh No. 11 Union Free Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d at 30–31.
121 See Sam M. ex rel. Elliott v. Carcieri, 608 F.3d 77, 92 (1st Cir. 2010).
122 See Greenburgh No. 11 Union Free Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d at 31.
123 See Rawlings v. Littleton, 23 F.3d 408 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Rule 17(c) in noting that
parents can be appointed next friends); In re Murray, 199 B.R. 165, 173 (Bankr. M.D.
Tenn. 1996) (“There is no evidence that this infant’s best interests are not being protected
by her mother. . . . [T]he debtor’s mother may act as the debtor’s next friend.”). Indeed,
some courts refer to parents as next friends despite recognizing them to be general
representatives. Brophy, 124 F.3d at 895; Doe v. Carnival Corp., 37 F. Supp. 3d 1254, 1258
(S.D. Fla. 2012).
124 Compare Brophy, 124 F.3d at 897 (“[O]rdinarily the eligibles will be confined to the
plaintiff’s parents, older siblings (if there are no parents), or a conservator or other
guardian, akin to a trustee . . . .”), with Ingram ex rel. Ingram v. Ainsworth, 184 F.R.D. 90,
92 (S.D. Miss. 1999) (“There are no special requirements for serving as a next friend. At its
discretion, the court may consider whether there is a significant relationship between the
next friend and the incompetent party and whether there is a legitimate reason why the
actual party cannot bring suit.”).
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courts that express a preference for parents serving as next friends
describe this preference as a common-sense measure, rather than a
result dictated or supported by parents’ constitutional rights.125
2. Parents and Guardians ad Litem
Like next friends, guardians ad litem act on behalf of and make
decisions for child litigants within a particular case.126 Historically,
guardians ad litem represented defendants; today, courts appoint
guardians ad litem to represent both parties.127 At least some courts
require parents to affirmatively seek court appointment as guardians
ad litem before they can represent their children.128
A more prominent concern for parents regarding guardian ad
litem appointment entails whether a court will appoint a guardian ad
litem to serve as a child’s representative in lieu of or in addition to a
parent. Courts that appoint guardians ad litem in cases brought by
parents typically do so because they identify an actual, or in some
cases, a potential conflict of interest in the case between the parent
and the child.129 Interestingly, courts’ imposition of what I call the
counsel mandate appears to allow courts to avoid making determina-
125 See, e.g., Brophy, 124 F.3d at 897.
126 See United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land, 795 F.2d 796, 805 (9th Cir. 1986) (“A
guardian ad litem is authorized to act on behalf of his ward and may make all appropriate
decisions in the course of specific litigation.”); Noe v. True, 507 F.2d 9, 12 (6th Cir. 1974)
(stating that a guardian ad litem is “appointed as a representative of the court to act for the
minor in the cause, with authority to engage counsel, file suit, and to prosecute, control and
direct the litigation” (quoting Fong Sik Leung v. Dulles, 226 F.2d 74, 82 (9th Cir. 1955)
(Boldt, J., concurring))).
127 See Till v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 124 F.2d 405, 408 (10th Cir. 1941)
(upholding verdict entered against minor defendants, concluding they were adequately
represented by voluntarily serving next friends, rather than court appointed guardians ad
litem, and noting that “[a] guardian ad litem is a special guardian, appointed by the court
to defend in behalf of an infant party. A next friend is one who, without being regularly
appointed guardian, represents an infant plaintiff”).
128 See, e.g., Mayall v. USA Water Polo, Inc., No. SACV 15-171-AG (RNBx), 2015 WL
12907832, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 8, 2015) (dismissing case upon defendant’s motion for
failure of mother to seek appointment as guardian ad litem for child plaintiff and finding
that guardian ad litem appointment is a prerequisite to a parent bringing a case on behalf
of a child); In re Murray, 199 B.R. at 173.
129 See, e.g., In re G & R Feed & Grain Co., No. 13-00001-als7, 2014 WL 8662773, at
*1–2 (S.D. Iowa July 3, 2014) (denying parents’ request to serve as guardians ad litem for
their children because the parents and children both are defendants in the suit and the
parents may be witnesses to the claims against the children); Horacek v. Exon, 357 F. Supp.
71, 74 (D. Neb. 1973) (appointing a guardian ad litem to serve in addition to parent
representatives, since the guardian ad litem could “recognize potential and actual
differences in positions by the parents and positions that need to be asserted on behalf of
the plaintiffs”).
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tions that parents are unfit to represent their children’s interests.130
Despite that the appointment of a guardian ad litem effectively
deprives a parent of decisionmaking authority over a child within a
particular case, courts consistently fail to analyze parents’ constitu-
tionally protected decisionmaking rights when considering whether
guardian ad litem appointment is warranted in a particular case.
Although courts identify no substantive differences between the
responsibilities of guardians ad litem and next friends,131 courts tend
to describe the responsibilities of guardians ad litem in loftier lan-
guage than that used to describe the role of next friends. This ten-
dency might stem from professional and economic considerations.
Many courts traditionally favor lawyers for guardian ad litem appoint-
ment,132 and several courts have held that guardians ad litem are enti-
tled to a fee for the services they render,133 as well as quasi-judicial
immunity for actions taken in conjunction with their role.134 Courts,
for example, describe guardians ad litem as “officer[s] of the court,”
130 See supra note 26 and accompanying text; Martin, No Right to Counsel, supra note
18 and accompanying text (collecting cases in which courts expressed a dim view of the
motivations of parents bringing cases on behalf of their children, including by identifying
them as repeat litigants).
131 See, e.g., C.M.J. ex rel. D.L.J. v. Walt Disney Parks & Resorts US, Inc., No. 6:14-cv-
1898-Orl-22GJK, 2017 WL 3065111, at *5 (M.D. Fla. July 19, 2017) (“A parent bringing a
personal injury claim as next friend on behalf of a child acts as a de facto guardian ad litem,
and is not the real party in interest insofar as the child’s claims; the child is the real party in
interest.”).
132 See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 13 F.R.D. 98, 105 (N.D. Ill.
1952) (“It is customary practice to appoint attorneys to serve in this capacity although, of
course, there is no statute or rule of law to this effect.”). Courts and scholars note that
simultaneous service as a guardian ad litem and a lawyer for a child may create a conflict of
interest for the lawyer. Moore, supra note 23, at 1842–43. But, unlike non-lawyer adult
representatives, whom courts typically direct to retain counsel or face dismissal of a child’s
case, lawyers may be able to represent children’s interests as guardians ad litem without
retaining separate counsel for the child. See, e.g., Tindall v. Poultney High Sch. Dist., 414
F.3d 281, 284 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[A] parent not admitted to the bar cannot bring an action
pro se in federal court on behalf of his or her child.”); Brown v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc.,
868 F. Supp. 168, 170–72 (E.D. Va. 1994) (stating that a non-lawyer parent cannot serve as
next friend for a child litigant without retaining counsel). See generally Martin, No Right to
Counsel, supra note 18, at 840–54.
133 See Gaddis v. United States, 381 F.3d 444, 456 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that guardians
ad litem can be awarded fees as expert costs authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(6) because
they “liaise with the court and are charged with the important duty of providing their
insight as to how the judicial process is or is not comporting with the best interests of the
minor or incompetent person involved”); United States v. Simmons, No. 4:13-CV-066-A,
2013 WL 5873366, at *4–7 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2013) (dismissing case brought against minor
defendant because of plaintiff’s failure to pay for attorney guardian ad litem or offer
solution for how costs would be paid). My research has not uncovered any cases awarding
fees to next friends or expressing a preference for next friends who are attorneys.
134 Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding guardians ad litem entitled to
quasi-judicial immunity).
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who “perform independent functions that are integral and essential to
the judicial process,”135 and alleviate the risk of the minor party
becoming “a pawn to be manipulated on a chess board larger than his
own case.”136 Guardians ad litem must “assist the court ‘to secure the
just, speedy [sic] and inexpensive determination’ of the action,”137
examine the case, determine the rights and defenses and interests of
the child, “vigorously” present the child’s defense, and “submit to the
court for its consideration and decision every question involving the
rights of the infant which may be affected by the action.”138 One court
explained that “through a guardian ad litem the court itself assumes
ultimate responsibility for determinations made on behalf of the
child.”139 Thus, courts may view guardians ad litem as professionals in
whom the court has made a financial investment, and this view may
thereby inflate the relative importance of guardians ad litem in rela-
tion to other adult representatives in the eyes of the court.
Perhaps because guardians ad litem are appointed by courts,
courts treat their qualification for appointment as a matter within
courts’ discretion and generally do not articulate factors that qualify
an individual for service in this role. Instead, court analysis focuses
primarily on whether the appointment of any guardian ad litem is
warranted to protect a child’s interests in a particular case. Courts’
understanding of the circumstances warranting guardian ad litem
appointment vary widely. This understanding may be influenced by
state law,140 although many courts make clear that guardian ad litem
appointment is a procedural matter controlled by federal doctrine.141
A small subset of courts appear to refer to all adult representatives as
135 Gaddis, 381 F.3d at 456.
136 Lenhard v. Wolff, 443 U.S. 1306, 1312 (1979).
137 Fong Sik Leung v. Dulles, 226 F.2d 74, 82 (9th Cir. 1955) (Boldt, J., concurring)
(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1).
138 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 13 F.R.D. 98, 104–05 (N.D. Ill.
1952).
139 Noe, 507 F.2d at 12.
140 T.W. ex rel. Enk v. Brophy, 954 F. Supp. 1306, 1309 (E.D. Wis. 1996), aff’d as
modified, 124 F.3d 893 (7th Cir. 1997) (“While a guardian ad litem is appointed by the
court and, in Wisconsin, must be a lawyer, neither of those restrictions apply to a next
friend.”).
141 See, e.g., Burke v. Smith, 252 F.3d 1260, 1264 (11th Cir. 2001) (“The appointment of
a guardian ad litem is a procedural question controlled by Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.” (quoting Roberts v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 256 F.2d 35, 38 (5th Cir.
1958)); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Callahan, 127 F.2d 32, 36 (10th Cir. 1942) (“How
appellee was required to proceed, in whose name the action must be filed, is procedural,
and therefore determined by the law of the forum.”); see also Meyers v. United States, No.
6:13-CV-1555-ORL, 2014 WL 5038585, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2014) (concluding that
although Burke was an Erie case its holding is broad enough to extend to cases raising
federal questions).
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guardians ad litem and require all to secure court appointment.142
More often, courts appear to reserve the designation “guardian ad
litem” for adult representatives recruited and appointed by courts to
represent children who lack a willing, appropriate volunteer.143
Courts’ views on when circumstances warrant guardian ad litem
appointment run the gamut: Some courts presume that guardians ad
litem generally should be appointed for child litigants,144 some courts
have held that guardians ad litem always must be appointed when a
litigant is a child,145 whereas others appoint as a last resort, only where
a child lacks an adult who will voluntarily serve as a next friend.146
Rule 17(c)(2) requires that where a child is unrepresented in a
case, a court must appoint a guardian ad litem or take other action to
protect the child’s interests in the case.147 Although the Rule limits
appointment to cases in which a child is unrepresented, courts claim
broad authority to appoint guardians ad litem under their inherent
powers if a child’s representative has or may have a conflict of inter-
ests, or if a court believes that appointment will serve a child’s best
interests.148 Several courts have held that where a parent appears on a
child’s behalf, the child is “otherwise represented” in the case and
142 This approach is particularly common, although not exclusive, to federal courts in
California that apply California law when addressing this question. See, e.g., Mayall v.
USA Water Polo, Inc., No. SACV 15-171-AG (RNBx), 2015 WL 12907832, at *3 (C.D. Cal.
June 8, 2015) (stating that the mother must seek appointment as guardian ad litem before
she may bring suit on behalf of her child); see also B.D. ex rel. Dragomir v. Griggs, No.
1:09CV439, 2010 WL 2775697, at *1 (W.D.N.C. June 8, 2010) (“Minors may not appear as
litigants in federal civil procedures without the assistance of guardians ad litem.”).
143 United States v. Noble, 269 F. Supp. 814, 816 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
144 E.g., Roberts v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 256 F.2d 35, 39 (5th Cir. 1958) (“(1) . . . [T]he
court should usually appoint a guardian ad litem; (2) but the Court may . . . issue such
order as will protect the minor in lieu of appointment of a guardian ad litem; (3) and may
even decide that such appointment is unnecessary.”).
145 See, e.g., Mayall, 2015 WL 12907832, at *3; Griggs, 2010 WL 2775697, at *1.
146 Noble, 269 F. Supp. at 816.
147 A court may even permit a child’s case to proceed without an adult representative
where the court finds that the child’s interests will be adequately protected. See Westcott v.
U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 158 F.2d 20, 22 (4th Cir. 1946) (affirming a judgment against a
minor who was represented by an attorney but not a guardian ad litem).
148 See, e.g., In re Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 788 F.2d 1280, 1282 (7th Cir. 1986)
(“If there were some reason to think that [the infant’s] mother would not represent [the
infant’s] interests adequately, the district court would, we may assume, be required (and
certainly would be empowered) to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent [the infant].”);
Hoffert v. Gen. Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 161, 164 (5th Cir. 1981) (“[T]he courts have
consistently recognized that they have inherent power to appoint a guardian ad litem when
it appears that the minor’s general representative has interests which may conflict with
those of the person he is supposed to represent.” (citations omitted)); von Bulow ex rel.
Auersperg v. von Bulow, 634 F. Supp. 1284, 1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (“Both federal and New
York state courts have repeatedly affirmed the power of the court to determine that the
interests of a child or incompetent would best be represented not by a general
representative, such as parent or guardian, but by a guardian ad litem or ‘next friend.’”).
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court appointment of a guardian ad litem is thereby precluded under
Rule 17(c)(2).149 Notably, such courts describe the possibility of
guardian ad litem appointment as “unnecessary” rather than improper
or unlawful.150 Although perhaps an implicit recognition of parental
authority, the use of the term “unnecessary” permits courts to sidestep
the question of the impact of guardian ad litem appointment on par-
ents’ constitutionally protected decisionmaking rights.
D. Harms of the Doctrinal Tangle of Rule 17(c)
As discussed more fully in Part II, the failure of Rule 17(c) and its
doctrine to defer to parents as representatives for children deprives
parents of their constitutionally protected decisionmaking authority
over their children and deprives children of the assurance that their
parents will make important decisions on their behalf. In addition to
these parenting-related harms, the many inconsistencies in courts’
interpretation of Rule 17(c) create several inefficiencies that burden
access to justice for children and impede court administration. First,
parents, counsel, and courts themselves must invest time and
resources to determine how to proceed with a claim and, potentially,
correct errors. These challenges pose a particularly significant barrier
for low-income parents, who may be unable to retain counsel without
court appointment, and therefore must attempt to sort out for them-
149 See, e.g., Kile v. United States, 915 F.3d 682, 687 (10th Cir. 2019) (“[A]bsent an
apparent conflict of interest, the appointment of a guardian ad litem is not necessary where
a parent is a party to the lawsuit and presses the child’s claims before the court.”); Burke v.
Smith, 252 F.3d 1260, 1264 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Tammy was ‘otherwise represented’ by her
mother who brought this action on her behalf. Thus, Rule 17(c) did not require . . . a
guardian ad litem. . . . [U]nless a conflict of interest exists . . . a district court need not even
consider the question whether a guardian ad litem should be appointed.” (citations
omitted)); Croce v. Bromley Corp., 623 F.2d 1084, 1093 (5th Cir. 1980) (“Rule 17(c)
authorizes the district court to appoint a guardian ad litem ‘for an infant . . . not otherwise
represented in an action . . . .’ In the instant case the infant was ‘otherwise
represented’ . . . . [T]here was no need for the court to appoint a guardian ad litem.”).
150 See, e.g., In re Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 788 F.2d at 1282 (“If [a minor] is a
party and represented, the appointment of a guardian is not required, provided the
representation is adequate . . . and there was no conflict of interest between the party and
his representative.” (citation omitted)); Croce, 623 F.2d at 1093 (concluding that there was
“no need” for a guardian ad litem to be appointed); Gonzalez-Jimenez de Ruiz v. United
States, 231 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1196–97 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (“[The plaintiffs’ mother] was not
required to file the current lawsuit as a ‘next friend.’ When a parent ‘brings an action on
behalf of a child, and . . . the interests of each are the same, no need exists for someone
[else] to represent the child’s interests under Rule 17(c).’” (citing Gonzalez ex rel.
Gonzalez v. Reno, 86 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1185 (S.D. Fla.), aff’d sub nom. Gonzalez v. Reno,
212 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2000))).
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selves at the outset of a case how to convey the role in which they
intend to proceed and why they qualify to serve.151
These inefficiencies are exacerbated by the disconnect between
Rule 17(c) doctrine and the contemporary reality of decisionmaking
regarding minors. The absence of a clear fit for parents within Rule
17(c) and its doctrine is a relic disconnected from modern life and
from historic practice.152 Courts have long recognized parents as the
adults most likely to advance children’s claims in practice, and the
empirical research undertaken for this project supports that parents
are indeed the adults who typically bring federal civil claims on behalf
of their children.153 As most children lack court-appointed general
representatives and have little tangible property,154 the more critical
151 Civil litigants have no constitutionally guaranteed right to the assistance of counsel.
Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 448 (2011) (holding that state appointed counsel is not
necessarily required to protect the due process rights of indigent defendants in civil child
support enforcement cases); Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25–27 (1981).
Federal courts can, but rarely do, request counsel to represent litigants who cannot afford
counsel and have not shown a special propensity to appoint counsel for cases brought on
behalf of indigent children. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) (2012); Martin, No Right to Counsel,
supra note 18, at n.132 and accompanying text. There is a dearth of free and affordable
legal assistance available to those with low and moderate incomes. LEGAL SERVS. CORP.,
DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL
NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 19–21 (2009), http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/
LSC/pdfs/documenting_the_justice_gap_in_america_2009.pdf (reporting that in 2007, there
was “only one legal aid lawyer” available for every “6,415 low-income people in the
country” while there was one lawyer providing legal services for private individuals and
families “for every 429 people in the general population”).
152 See supra notes 74, 76 and accompanying text.
153 See Table: Cases 2015–18, supra note 18; see also Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for
Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 841 n.44 (1977) (“[C]hildren usually lack the capacity to
make [decisions about their interests;] . . . their interest is ordinarily represented in
litigation by parents or guardians.”); Bank of United States v. Ritchie, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 128,
144 (1834) (“[Infants] defend by guardian to be appointed by the court, who is usually the
nearest relation not concerned, in point of interest, in the matter in question.”); Johnson v.
Collins, 5 F. App’x 479, 485 (7th Cir. 2001) (“To maintain a suit in a federal court, a child
or mental incompetent must be represented by a competent adult, ordinarily a parent or
relative.”); see also Ritchie, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 144 (“It is not error, but it is calculated to
awaken attention that, in this case, though the infants, as the record shows, had parents
living; a person not appearing from his name, or shown on the record to be connected with
them, was appointed their guardian ad litem.”); Reno, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 1185 (“The
participation of a non-parent [as next friend] should give the Court some pause, but may
be appropriate in certain circumstances.”).
154 “Guardianship of children with living parents became less common once laws
provided widows the right to oversee their minor children’s property.” Smith, supra note
67, at 280 n.53; id. at 274 (“Today, guardianships are rarely needed to ensure appropriate
management of a child’s property. Instead, they are most commonly employed to address a
child’s need for care of their ‘person’ when a living parent is in a crisis that limits their
ability—at least temporarily—to provide such care.”); see also Scott J. Shackelford &
Lawrence M. Friedman, Legally Incompetent: A Research Note, 49 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 321
(2007) (explaining that most children, including orphans, had no money of their own and
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contemporary determinant of a parent’s day-to-day legal authority is
whether a parent is a child’s legal guardian or custodian, not whether
a parent has administrative domain over a child’s estate.155 The failure
of Rule 17(c) and its doctrine to recognize parents as the default deci-
sionmakers for children thus significantly departs from the public’s
common understanding of the rights and responsibilities of parents
and creates an unnecessary administrative burden for children, par-
ents, and courts, as courts undertake anew the exercise of determining
how parents fit within the rule in every case.
Finally, the failure to defer to parents as children’s default repre-
sentatives creates a potential cost barrier that may impede low-income
children from securing access to justice. This barrier stems from
courts’ practice of awarding fees to court-appointed guardians ad
litem (who have no pre-existing relationship with a child litigant).156
Courts already typically order parents to retain private counsel as a
condition of the litigation.157 This requirement already frequently
leads to the dismissal of cases brought by parents who cannot afford
counsel.158 Guardian ad litem appointment potentially saddles parents
with an even further increased cost burden beyond that normally asso-
ciated with attorney’s fees.159 To the extent that courts might be more
guardianship typically concerned cases of inheritance or rare instances of minors who
earned money).
155 See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 14–15 (2004) (holding
that the father could not bring a case on behalf of his child nor to vindicate his own
parental rights over the objection of the child’s mother because the mother had sole legal
custody); Croce, 623 F.2d at 1093 (finding that the lower court did not err by failing to
consider the appointment of a guardian ad litem where “the child’s legal guardian, his
mother, brought this action on his behalf”).
156 See supra note 133 and accompanying text; United States v. Noble, 269 F. Supp. 814,
816 (E.D.N.Y. 1967) (“Every effort should be made by the District Courts of the United
States to reduce costs by avoiding the appointment of independent guardians unless there
is a substantial probability of a conflict of interest and need for protection.”).
157 See, e.g., Shepherd v. Wellman, 313 F.3d 963, 970 (6th Cir. 2002) (explaining that a
parent cannot appear pro se on behalf of their minor child because the cause of action does
not belong to the parent); Johns v. County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding that a parent or guardian cannot bring an action on behalf of a minor child
without retaining counsel); Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 882–83 (3d Cir.
1991) (finding that a non-attorney parent is not entitled to act as his children’s attorney in
federal court and must be represented by counsel); Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found. of
Buffalo, Inc., 906 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that a non-attorney father must hire a
lawyer in order to bring an action on behalf of his child); Meeker v. Kercher, 782 F.2d 153,
154 (10th Cir. 1986) (finding that a parent does not have the right to represent their minor
children and the parent must be represented by an attorney in order to act as next friend of
the child). See generally Martin, No Right to Counsel, supra note 18, at 834–35.
158 Martin, No Right to Counsel, supra note 18, at 839.
159 See, e.g., Gaddis v. United States, 381 F.3d 444, 454–55 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding it is
within the court’s discretion to tax guardian ad litem fees as costs to the non-prevailing
party or to designate guardian ad litem fees “as an expense to be payable out of any funds
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likely to supplant parents that courts view as less sophisticated or pos-
sibly constrained by limited financial resources, the risk of guardian ad
litem fees may disproportionately fall upon the families least able to
afford them.160
Across the many variations in courts’ interpretations of Rule
17(c), courts understand the question of adult representation for child
litigants as a matter wholly within their discretion and act to preserve
their power.161 Courts entirely fail to consider the extent to which con-
stitutional protections for parental decisionmaking limit courts’
authority over the representation of child litigants and shape how that
discretion must be exercised. Part II aims to redress this gap.
II
LITIGATION AS PARENTING
This Part first explores the constitutional doctrine that establishes
parents’ decisionmaking rights. It then connects that doctrine to par-
ents’ role as litigation representatives for their children. In doing so, it
fills the gap in courts’ analysis of Rule 17(c) by reconceiving of parent
representatives as parenting through litigation. Recognizing parent
representatives as parenting suggests that constitutional jurisprudence
must guide the selection of adult representatives for children under
Rule 17(c). Finally, this Part evaluates the policy benefits of applying
these constitutional principles for parents, children, and the courts.
recovered by or payable to the minor or incompetent person on whose behalf the guardian
ad litem was appointed”); Bhatia v. Corrigan, No. C 07-2054 CW, 2007 WL 1455908, at *2
(N.D. Cal. May 16, 2007) (ordering guardian ad litem fees to be paid “either out of any
damages award or by Jane Doe, through her father”); Friends for All Children, Inc. v.
Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 533 F. Supp. 895, 900–01 (D.D.C. 1982) (finding that the court
has the authority to tax guardian ad litem fees as costs to the non-prevailing party). See
generally Martin, No Right to Counsel, supra note 18, at 835.
160 Court determinations about parent capacity to represent a child could be influenced
by implicit bias against less privileged groups. See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
Moreover, because courts typically dismiss cases brought pro se by low income parents for
lack of counsel, it is not possible to determine whether courts are more likely in practice to
permit higher-income parents to serve as children’s litigation representatives than lower-
income parents, but hints of courts’ concern about parent sophistication and ability appear
in court opinions applying the counsel mandate. See supra note 130 and accompanying
text.
161 See, e.g., Developmental Disabilities Advocacy Ctr., Inc. v. Melton, 689 F.2d 281,
285–86 (1st Cir. 1982) (holding a parent is a “like fiduciary” who can bring a claim on
behalf of a child under Rule 17(c)(1), but since a parent is not a court-appointed
representative, the court retains the power to appoint a next friend or guardian ad litem if
the court chooses); Gonzalez ex rel. Gonzalez v. Reno, 86 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1185 (S.D.
Fla.), aff’d sub nom. Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2000) (“The participation
of a non-parent [as next friend] should give the Court some pause, but may be appropriate
in certain circumstances.”).
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A. Constitutional Protections for Parental Decisionmaking
Parents’ caretaking rights are not only rooted in the law of guard-
ianship but also guaranteed by the Constitution. The Supreme Court
recognizes the relationships between parents and children as pro-
tected from governmental interference by a sphere of family privacy
created by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.162 Specifically, the guarantee of liberty within the Due
Process Clauses includes parents’ fundamental interest in the “care,
custody, and control of their children”163—“perhaps the oldest of the
fundamental liberty interests recognized by [the Supreme] Court.”164
Parental liberty interests are deemed fundamental rights and strongly
protected, in part, because of the centrality of the family within our
history and traditions, but Justices articulate a range of views on how
such traditions should be identified and understood.165 Although the
162 See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality opinion)
(“A host of [Supreme Court] cases . . . have consistently acknowledged a ‘private realm of
family life which the state cannot enter.’” (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
166 (1944))). Although cases addressing parental rights typically address state government
action under the Fourteenth Amendment, these protections also constrain the federal
government under the Fifth Amendment. See Developments in the Law: The Constitution
and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1187 (1980).
163 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (plurality opinion) (“[I]t cannot now be
doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the
fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control
of their children.”); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (noting that there is a
“fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of
their child”); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (“Our jurisprudence historically has
reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority
over minor children. Our cases have consistently followed that course . . . .”); Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (“We have recognized on numerous occasions that the
relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected.”); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (“The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong
tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary
role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as
an enduring American tradition.”); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (“It is plain
that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or
her children ‘come[s] to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is
made to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic arrangements.’” (quoting
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949))).
164 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65; see also Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as
Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401, 2406–08 (1995) (tracing the history of respect for
parental authority throughout U.S. history).
165 Compare Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123–24 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality
opinion) (finding the Court must identify the most specific level of tradition available when
determining whether to recognize a liberty interest as protected by substantive due
process) with id. at 132 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing the Court should remain open
to considering traditions at broader levels of generality when evaluating whether asserted
interests warrant due process protection), and id. at 137 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(explaining the traditional importance of asserted interests is the proper concern of due
process analysis, not whether the specific asserted interest was traditionally protected).
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full scope and extent of parents’ protected liberty interests remain
unclear,166 those interests, at a minimum, include the right to “estab-
lish a home and bring up children,”167 the entitlement to maintain cus-
tody of their children absent a showing of unfitness,168 and the ability
to make choices about their children’s health,169 education,170 contact
with non-parents,171 and involvement with religion.172
Government actions or policies that substantially and directly
infringe upon fundamental rights generally trigger strict scrutiny.173 To
survive strict scrutiny, the government must demonstrate that
infringements upon fundamental rights are narrowly tailored to serve
a compelling government interest.174 Yet, despite its repeated recogni-
tion of parental rights as fundamental, the Supreme Court has not
consistently applied strict scrutiny to questions of parental decision-
making.175 This disconnect may result from the reality that questions
regarding parental rights often require the Court to reconcile those
166 Vivian E. Hamilton, Immature Citizens and the State, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1055,
1085–86 (2010) (noting that the “magnitude and contours” of the substantive right to
parent are “notoriously indistinct”).
167 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
168 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658.
169 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 588 & n.3, 604, 620–21 (1979) (upholding Georgia’s
mental hospital commitment statute, which permitted parents or guardians to request that
their child be committed if there was evidence of mental illness, because parental decisions
regarding a child’s medical care should receive great deference).
170 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (finding parental liberty to
direct upbringing and education of children encompasses the choice to send child to
private school and precludes the state from outlawing non-public schools); Meyer, 262 U.S.
at 401 (finding that the restriction of school curricula to prohibit the teaching of “modern”
languages other than English before the eighth grade unconstitutionally infringed on
parents’ liberty interest in controlling “the education of their own”).
171 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 67 (2000) (plurality opinion).
172 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214–15 (1972).
173 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1271
(2007) (describing how strict scrutiny was adopted as a test for protecting fundamental
rights). The burden must be direct to trigger strict scrutiny. See Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality opinion) (noting that the housing ordinance
at issue directly interfered with the ability of family members to choose to live together by
singling out particular family relationships; it did not merely incidentally burden that
choice). See generally Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1175, 1177 (1996) (noting that the Supreme Court draws a sharp distinction
between direct and incidental burdens on fundamental rights, applying strict scrutiny to
direct burdens and more deferential scrutiny to incidental burdens, and arguing that
incidental burdens also deserve heightened scrutiny).
174 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (stating that laws
that “impinge on personal rights protected by the Constitution,” are “subjected to strict
scrutiny and will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state
interest”).
175 Michael J. Higdon, The Quasi-Parent Conundrum, 90 COLO. L. REV. 941, 985–86
(2019) (arguing that many of the Supreme Court’s parental rights decisions appear to
implement a reasonablenesss test or heightened review rather than strict scrutiny).
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rights with the government’s authority to protect children176 and,
sometimes, with children’s own constitutional rights.177
Nonetheless, at a minimum, Supreme Court doctrine dictates that
government actions that substantially and directly interfere with fit
parents’ decisions must survive heightened scrutiny.178 In reviewing
such intrusions, courts must give parents’ decisions “special weight”
and must presume that fit parents act in their children’s best inter-
ests.179 The Court has said: “So long as a parent adequately cares for
his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the
State to . . . further question the ability of that parent to make the best
decisions concerning the rearing of that parent’s children.”180 In fact,
the Supreme Court has protected parents’ discretion to make a
number of arguably bad decisions for their children, including termi-
nating children’s education beyond the eighth grade181 and “volunta-
rily” committing children to mental institutions.182 According to the
176 State power to protect children derives from two distinct sources. First, states are
entitled to employ the police power to regulate conduct that poses a harm to all citizens.
Second, states exercise the parens patriae power to ensure the welfare of children and
vulnerable adults. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (noting that
the Court has upheld the state’s police power authority to provide for the health, safety,
and morality of the public as a basis for legislation); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766
(1982) (recognizing that, as parens patriae, the state has an interest in promoting the
welfare of children); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (determining that
when “[a]cting to guard the general interest in youth’s well being, the state as parens
patriae may restrict the parent’s control”); Jacobson v. Massachussetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)
(finding that police power justifies state vaccination mandates).
177 See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)
(“Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains
the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the
Constitution and possess constitutional rights.”). See generally Homer H. Clark, Jr.,
Children and the Constitution, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (exploring what rights the
Constitution, and more specifically the Bill of Rights, grants to minors); Anne C. Dailey,
Children’s Constitutional Rights, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2099 (2011) (presenting a
developmental theory of children’s constitutional rights).
178 Moore, 431 U.S. at 499 (holding that when reviewing laws intruding on family living
arrangements, “this Court must examine carefully the importance of the governmental
interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by the challenged regulation”);
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 69 (2000) (plurality opinion) (applying heightened scrutiny
but neither specifying the standard applied nor clarifying whether the “special weight”
framework used extends to other contexts).
179 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68–69.
180 Id.
181 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230 (1972) (explaining that the parens patriae
power did not permit the state to override the religious beliefs of Amish parents and force
Amish children to attend school beyond eighth grade because the case was “not one in
which any harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to the public safety, peace,
order, or welfare has been demonstrated or may be properly inferred”).
182 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). Indeed, the Court has advised: “That some
parents ‘may at times be acting against the interests of their children’ . . . creates a basis for
caution, but is hardly a reason to discard wholesale those pages of human experience that
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Court, “the Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on
the fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions
simply because a state judge believes a ‘better’ decision could be
made.”183
B. Parenting in Court
Despite the strong constitutional protections for parental deci-
sionmaking, Rule 17(c) doctrine permits courts to push parents aside
and allow non-parents to represent children’s interests.184 Federal
courts’ consistent failure to recognize the relevance of parents’ consti-
tutional rights to the question of who should represent a child stems in
part from courts’ failure to understand parent representatives as
enaged in parenting. Courts largely overlook that, just as parental
decisions about school and medical care can have short- and long-
term implications on a child’s well-being, litigation decisions can have
both short- and long-term impacts on child well-being, including by
determining the rights, defenses, and interests of a child,185 controlling
the litigation, deciding whether to go to trial or accept a settlement,
and retaining (and financing) counsel.
Indeed, litigation undertaken by parents can be understood as
part of a chain of decisionmaking intended to protect a child’s inter-
ests. For example, Leonard Tinker’s decision to represent his chil-
dren’s interests in court was integral to his parenting because he
believed he should support his children in matters of conscience. On
teach that parents generally do act in the child’s best interests.” Id. at 602–03 (quoting
Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1047–48 (E.D. Pa. 1975), vacated, 431 U.S. 119
(1977)).
183 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72–73; see also E. Gary Spitko, Reclaiming the “Creatures of the
State”: Contracting for Child Custody Decisionmaking in the Best Interests of the Family, 57
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1139, 1204–08 (2000) (finding the parens patriae power authorizes
the state to interfere with parental authority to enforce minimum social standards of child
well-being—ensuring children are protected from abuse and neglect and comply with
obligations about which there is significant social consensus—but it does not authorize
state intervention to provide a child with an “optimal” experience). The state will be
justified in its use of the parens patriae power where the risk of harm is deemed to be
sufficiently high. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (holding that
prohibiting children from preaching in public spaces to protect them from the risk of
physical or psychological injury was a valid exercise of the parens patriae power and
justified overriding parents’ liberty interests in the care and control of their children and in
religious liberty).
184 Although federal courts observe that parents often do represent children before
courts, courts frequently fail to recognize that parents should as a matter of constitutional
right. See supra note 153 (providing examples of cases where courts recognized the ability
of parents to represent their children in court).
185 See, e.g., Noe v. True, 507 F.2d 9, 11–12 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. E.I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 13 F.R.D. 98, 104–05 (N.D. Ill. 1952) (noting that it is the duty of a
guardian ad litem to determine the interests of a child and vigorously defend that interest).
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December 17, 1965, as John Tinker prepared to leave for school with a
black armband in his pocket, his father stopped him.186 John’s sister,
Mary Beth, had been suspended from school the day before for
wearing an armband. John’s father asked John if he was sure he
wanted to do the same, saying, “[t]he school made a rule and maybe
that’s the way it should be.”187 John told him: “This is a piece of black
cloth. People are dying in Vietnam.”188 John’s father asked, “You
believe it’s a matter of conscience?” “I guess so,” John replied.189
“Then I support you,” his father said.190 After his children were both
suspended, Leonard Tinker initially resisted the idea of litigation,
believing the dispute would be better resolved through conversa-
tion.191 But when it became clear that the school board was unwilling
to compromise, Mr. Tinker agreed that litigation was required.192 To
Tinker, then, that litigation was more than a matter of last resort, it
was a parenting decision to support his children.
Similarly, the case of Briggs v. Elliott,193 one of the consolidated
cases heard as Brown v. Board of Education,194 resulted from the con-
cerns of Eliza and Harry Briggs and several other parents in
Summerton, South Carolina, about the dangers to their children’s
health and well-being from their long daily walks to and from
school.195 Eight year-old Harry Briggs, Jr. had to walk five miles each
way between home and school, and some children were forced to walk
as far as ten miles.196 During their trek, children frequently faced
flood waters that covered roads behind the newly constructed Santee
Dam, requiring them to cross in a rowboat.197 The Reverend Joseph
186 Mike Kilen, The Eccentric Life of the Former Des Moines Student Who Still Inspires
Student Marches, DES MOINES REGISTER (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.desmoinesregister.
com/story/news/2018/03/22/tinker-supreme-court-armband-protest-student-march-our-
lives/441296002.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 40th Anniversary of Supreme Court Decision on Student Speech, CSPAN (Feb. 11,
2009), https://www.c-span.org/video/?283995-1/40th-anniversary-supreme-court-decision-
student-speech.
192 Id.
193 98 F. Supp. 529 (E.D.S.C. 1951).
194 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
195 Sam Roberts, Harry Briggs Jr., a Catalyst for Brown v. Board of Education, Dies at
75, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2016), https://nytimes.com/2016/08/18/us/harry-briggs-jr-a-
catalyst-for-brown-v-board-of-education-dies-at-75.html.
196 Id.
197 Orville Vernon Burton et al., Seeds in Unlikely Soil: The Briggs v. Elliott School
Segregation Case, in TOWARD THE MEETING OF THE WATERS: CURRENTS IN THE CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT OF SOUTH CAROLINA DURING THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 179
(Winfred B. Moore Jr. & Orville Vernon Burton eds., 2008).
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Armstrong De Laine, a school principal, organized the Briggs and
eighteen other parents to petition the school board for buses to trans-
port the children, like the thirty the county provided for white chil-
dren. When the school board rejected their request, they decided to
sue, ultimately challenging not only the lack of transportation, but
also the inferior conditions of their schools and the harm wrought by
segregation itself.198 Although the case also pursued higher ideals of
equality, for the parents, the litigation was also fundamentally about
what was best for their children. As Maize Solomon, another of the
parents, put it, “[o]ur children didn’t have a bus; they didn’t have
desks.”199
These anecdotes shine light on the hidden threads of parenting
woven throughout litigation. Litigation is an extension of parents’
rights to make decisions regarding their children and one step in a
course of conduct undertaken to advance children’s interests. Like
other decisions made by parents on behalf of their children, the choice
to pursue litigation entails a cost-benefit analysis that encompasses
numerous factors beyond the issues entailed in the legal dispute, and
that relates to events and consequences preceding and following the
course of a case itself.
The parenting that occurs within litigation becomes evident when
a legal matter is viewed in its full context. The operative incidents
underlying a child’s legal claims may result from parenting decisions
and concerns, like Mr. Tinker’s decision to permit John to leave for
school prepared to wear his armband, and the Briggs’ concerns about
the impact on their son of the long daily walks to and from school.
Likewise, the choice to pursue litigation may result from parents’
failed attempts to redress harms done to children through other
means, like the Tinkers’ attempt to address the policies that led to
their children’s suspensions with the school board, and the Briggs’
attempt to petition their school board for bus funding. Finally, choices
about the course of litigation and how to navigate whatever outcomes
result from a case have real and potentially significant impacts on a
198 Roberts, supra note 195. Whereas the school for white children in Clarendon County
had science labs and a cafeteria, the schools for black children often lacked electricity and
running water. Bitter Resistance: Clarendon County, South Carolina, SMITHSONIAN NAT’L
MUSEUM OF AM. HIST., https://americanhistory.si.edu/brown/history/4-five/clarendon-
county-2.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2020). The National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People (NAACP), which served as counsel to the plaintiffs in the Brown
consolidated cases, initially hesitated to take on Briggs out of concerns about the severity
of reprisals the plaintiffs were likely to face, which they feared would cause the plaintiffs to
abandon the litigation. Burton et al., supra note 197, at 181.
199 Darryl Lorenzo Wellington, Ambiguous Legacy: Summerton, South Carolina, and
Briggs v. Elliott, 51 DISSENT 45, 47 (2004).
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child’s daily life that parents will have to help children navigate. Such
choices include those Eliza and Harry Briggs faced when they both
were fired from their jobs after signing the petition, their son was fired
from his paper route, and the family was warned away from entering
any white neighborhoods for fear they would be harmed.200 The
family ultimately moved to Florida after local merchants thwarted the
Briggs’ efforts to support themselves by farming by refusing to sell
seed to Harry Briggs, Sr.201 In dealing with this backlash, the Briggs’
decision to continue with the case necessarily entailed more than just
their view that it served their son’s legal interests—it also required
them to decide as parents what broadly served the interests of their
family: continuing to stand up for what they thought was right, or
taking another course to protect their family’s safety and well-
being.202 Around this same time, Congressman John Lewis’s parents
made a different, understandable choice. Fearing the loss of their
tenant farm and violence to their family, friends, and neighbors,
Congressman Lewis’s parents declined to bring suit on his behalf to
challenge the whites-only admission policy at Alabama’s Troy State
University.203
These examples not only demonstrate the connections between
representing children in litigation and parenting, but also illustrate the
benefits of having parents play this role. Litigation decisions made by
a parent on behalf of a child can be understood as actions taken to
protect a child’s best interests both within and beyond litigation. In
short, the representation of children’s interests in litigation has a care-
taking component that deserves courts’ respect.
It could be argued that deference to parents as children’s litiga-
tion representatives should be subject-matter specific. That is, defer-
ence to parents may be appropriate in cases involving substantive
topics that fall within the parental decisionmaking purview under
existing constitutional doctrine (such as education), but parents
should not have priority in other types of cases.204 For several reasons,
200 See Roberts, supra note 195.
201 Id.
202 Indeed, for all the Briggs sacrificed, Harry Briggs, Jr. never “attend[ed] an integrated
class.” Id.
203 Helen Mondloch, Profile: Congressman John Lewis, NORTHERN VA. MAG. (May 6,
2016), https://www.northernvirginiamag.com/culture/news/2016/05/06/profile-congressman-
john-lewis.
204 See, e.g., Alison M. Brumley, Comment, Parental Control of a Minor’s Right to Sue
in Federal Court, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 333, 337–38 (1991) (arguing that parents should not
have authority to represent children in cases regarding children’s property rights and
financial interests, including tort claims, but should be considered as possible
representatives in claims seeking relief within the scope of parental authority).
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this Article proposes that a caretaking element is present in all types
of litigation, and therefore constitutional principles should guide the
analysis of whether courts should defer to a parent—as opposed to
another adult—as the decisionmaking representative for a child liti-
gant across all substantive case types.
To begin with, many of the same interests that support giving par-
ents primary decisionmaking authority over their children in general
warrant deferring to parents as the appropriate decisionmakers for
their children in litigation, regardless of the subject of the case. First,
protecting parents’ decisionmaking authority ensures that decisions
impacting children are made by people who care deeply about and
know children best.205 Parents are also best situated to anticipate the
likely impact of litigation decisions on the broader family and the
family’s resources, including time, emotional energy, and money, all of
which can affect a child’s overall well-being. Preserving parents’ dis-
cretion to decide whether their children should pursue litigation and
how such litigation should proceed may help prepare and motivate
parents to protect their children from any negative consequences that
result from the choice to litigate.
In addition to their relational bonds, parents also have special
insight into their children’s interests because parents are more likely
to share cultural and socio-economic characteristics and associated life
experiences with their children that may not match those of courts or
appointed non-parent representatives.206 These characteristics and
experiences inform parents’ understanding of their children’s needs
and interests and what will best advance them.207 And as with other
205 See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (“[H]istorically [the law] has recognized
that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.”);
GUGGENHEIM, supra note 29, at 46 (“[T]he core of the parental rights doctrine guarantees
children at least that the important decisions in their lives will be made by those who are
most likely to know them best and to care the most for them.”); Spitko, supra note 183, at
1209 (suggesting that parents’ deep knowledge of their children makes parents the best
prepared to make decisions about them).
206 See Michele Benedetto Neitz, Socioeconomic Bias in the Judiciary, 61 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 137, 142 (2013) (“Since people are ‘more favorably disposed to the familiar, and fear
or become frustrated with the unfamiliar,’ the wealthy positions of most judges may
prevent them from fully appreciating the challenges faced by poor litigants in their
courtrooms.” (quoting Rose Matsui Ochi, Racial Discrimination in Criminal Sentencing,
JUDGES J., Winter 1985, at 6, 53 (1985))); cf. Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the
Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1162–63 (2012) (describing how, when deciding on
motions to dismiss, “the more gap filling and inferential thinking that a judge has to engage
in, the more room there may be for explicit and implicit biases to structure the judge’s
assessment in the absence of a well-developed evidentiary record”).
207 See generally Wendy A. Bach, Flourishing Rights, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1061, 1075
(2015) (suggesting that parental involvement in decisionmaking is essential to a just child-
welfare system, particularly for those children impacted by racism or poverty).
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difficult decisions, fit parents can reasonably differ as to whether liti-
gation best meets their children’s needs and is worth its potential
risks.208
Critics might dispute the notion that parents actually have a suffi-
cient understanding of their children’s interests and experiences to
represent their interests effectively.209 This disconnect might result
because of children’s reticence to discuss their interests, reluctance to
contradict a parent or disclose all relevant facts, inability to identify
violations of their legal rights, or fear of expressing a legal grievance
about an authority figure.210 These critiques make the important point
that a parent’s knowledge of a child’s interests is likely only partial at
its best and a parent could easily misunderstand a child’s wishes.
Nonetheless, these barriers to understanding are not specific to par-
ents and would be present for anyone who seeks to understand and
effectively represent a child’s interests.211 In general, involved parents
are likely to be better situated to discern children’s interests, desires,
and intentions than another adult would be.212
Second, protecting parental freedom in litigation decisionmaking
ensures that lawsuits brought on behalf of children advance a plural-
istic range of values and bring a diverse range of legal issues before
the courts—not simply those values and claims selected as worthy of
vindication by the state or representatives appointed by the state to
act for children.213 As litigation occurs as a matter of public record,
litigation provides the opportunity to inform the community about
harms done to children. Further, because children are precluded from
participation in the electoral process, litigation provides a rare oppor-
tunity for children to shape how laws are interpreted and applied and
208 Cf. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 15 (2004) (noting that two
parents may have different views on potential litigation, particularly litigation over a
“highly public debate”).
209 See David H. Neely, Handicapped Advocacy: Inherent Barriers and Partial Solutions
in the Representation of Disabled Children, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 1359, 1363 (1982).
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Id. (explaining that although parents might not always accurately interpret children’s
desires, “parents in most cases have a more intimate familiarity with their children’s
communications and intentions than anyone else”).
213 Cf. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535 (“The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all
governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize
its children . . . .”); GUGGENHEIM, supra note 29, at 27 (“Our future as a democracy
depends on nurturing diversity of minds. The legal system’s insistence on private ordering
of familial life ultimately guards against state control of its citizens. Accordingly,
government must allow parents wide latitude to raise children as the parents wish to raise
them.” (footnote omitted)).
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make their voices heard on policies that impact them.214 Through liti-
gation, parents also prepare children for citizenship by demonstrating
what it means to participate in the judicial process, stand up for one’s
beliefs, and resolve disputes via the rule of law.215 Replacing parents
with court-appointed representatives risks homogenizing the choices
made on behalf of child litigants according to the perspectives of the
professional classes more likely to be called upon to serve as court-
appointed guardians ad litem by the courts.216
Finally, constitutional doctrine regarding the scope and extent of
parental decisionmaking authority remains underdeveloped and
neither accounts for the full range of concerns that parents should
have the primary opportunity to control,217 nor encompasses the full
universe of case types that could directly and indirectly implicate chil-
dren’s well-being.218 For example, Carmen Crespo’s decision to file
multiple tort claims on behalf of her daughter against the family’s
former landlord can be understood at a surface level to entail the right
to be compensated for private wrongdoing, which may not appear to
be a matter related to parental caretaking.219 But the case was also
fundamentally about a mother seeking to mitigate the long-term
impacts of lead poisoning upon her daughter, who had an intellectual
disability as a result of exposure to lead in the family’s apartment,
which the landlord failed to eradicate despite the mother’s repeated
214 See, e.g., Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016) (denying a
motion to dismiss in a case brought by minors against the federal government for
environmental harms and future climate change).
215 See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (“The child is not the
mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) (explaining that preparing children for
“additional obligations,” per Pierce, should be understood to include “the inculcation of
moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship”); cf. Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944) (“It is the interest of youth itself, and of the whole
community, that children be both safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities for
growth into free and independent well-developed men and citizens.”).
216 See supra note 132 and accompanying text (explaining that courts have often
appointed other lawyers as guardians ad litem).
217 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 78 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring) (“Our cases, it is
true, have not set out exact metes and bounds to the protected interest of a parent in the
relationship with his child . . . .”); see also Moore, supra note 23, at 1851–52 (noting that
courts are still in the early stages of deciding issues of children’s rights versus parental
rights as a matter of constitutional law).
218 Cf. Huntington & Scott, supra note 29 (manuscript at 35) (positing that doctrine
relating to parental authority and children’s constitutional rights can sometimes be
understood as aimed at promoting children’s well-being in addition to protecting liberty
interests).
219 Caban ex rel. Crespo v. 600 E. 21st St. Co., 200 F.R.D. 176 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
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complaints.220 For all of these reasons, limiting the legal topics over
which parents should have decisionmaking control to those that have
been explicitly considered by the Supreme Court would overly cir-
cumscribe parental authority and undermine parents’, children’s, and
the community’s interests served by vesting authority for decision-
making about children in their parents.221
Recognizing that parents’ fundamental liberty interest in care-
taking extends to litigation decisionmaking has some basis in practice.
At least one federal court has recognized parents’ interests in repre-
senting their children to have a constitutional foundation in a case
addressing issues squarely within the parental purview—education
and the regulation of homeschooling.222 Moreover, a few courts have
referenced constitutional principles in considering whether a child liti-
gant’s interests were adequately protected in a case. At least one court
cited the presumption that fit parents act in children’s interests to sup-
port its decision not to appoint a guardian ad litem.223 Another federal
court upheld a default judgment entered against a child defendant
where there was proper service upon the child’s parent, noting that “a
federal court should, as a matter of sound policy, be cautious in
attempting to step between the parent and his or her child.”224 The
court concluded that “[t]here may well be solid reasons why the
220 Id. at 178.
221 See supra notes 162–72 and accompanying text (listing domains where the Supreme
Court has addressed parental rights in decisionmaking).
222 In such cases, parents vindicate not only a child’s legal interests, but also the parents’
decisionmaking authority over the substantive matter at hand. See Jeffery v. O’Donnell,
702 F. Supp. 513, 515–16 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (declining to appoint a guardian ad litem where
parents represented their children in the case, because “[p]arents have a substantial
constitutional right to direct and control the upbringing and development of their minor
children,” and there was no evidence of a conflict between the interests of the parents and
the children in the case). Such circumstances also may confer independent standing on
parents to bring their own claims to advance children’s rights (in their own names, not their
children’s). See Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516,
528–29 (2007) (holding the IDEA grants parents independent standing to enforce
children’s statutory rights as real parties in interest, in part, because of the recognized
independent legal interest that parents have in the education of their children); Lehman v.
Lycoming Cty. Children’s Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 523–24 (1982) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (distinguishing the question of whether a mother could appropriately pursue a
habeas petition for the return of her children as “next friend” from the question of whether
she had standing to assert her own rights to their custody); Smith v. Org. of Foster Families
for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 841 n.44 (1977) (recognizing that the guardianship
rights of children’s natural parents, foster parents, and the state entitle each to be heard on
the question of what best serves the interests of the children in question, who were under
the state’s care in the foster care system).
223 United States v. Noble, 269 F. Supp. 814, 816 (E.D.N.Y. 1967) (“This Court is
permitted by Rule 17 to rely upon a fundamental assumption on which our society rests,
that parents are concerned about the welfare of their children.”).
224 Seibels, Bruce & Co. v. Nicke, 168 F.R.D. 542, 544 (M.D.N.C. 1996).
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parent does not file an answer on the minor’s behalf,” and absent indi-
cation otherwise, “it may be presumed that a parent acts in the best
interest of the child.”225 Similarly, at least one court characterized the
choice of “whether, and where, the child should sue” as “parental
policy decisions.”226 A California state court likewise held that a
statute of limitations precluded the litigation of a medical malpractice
claim by a child’s aunt that the child’s parents refused to bring when it
was timely.227 The court concluded that the decision whether to file a
malpractice action was reserved to parents, admonishing: “[e]xcept in
egregious situations calling for interference with legal custody, the
parents, not the courts, make decisions for the minor.”228 The court
further asserted that a court is not “well situated to judge the wisdom
of the parental choice to sue or not to sue,” concluding: “We are not
inclined to hold . . . that a lawsuit is always the best use of family
resources and energy. Nor are we inclined, or authorized, to take over
the decisions relative to the care of minors.”229
The Supreme Court recognized these connections in Elk Grove
Unified School District v. Newdow when it held that Newdow, a father
who lacked legal custody over his daughter, could not bring a claim
challenging the recitation of the pledge of allegiance in his daughter’s
school over the objection of her mother and legal custodian.230 The
Court reasoned that Newdow’s use of litigation was an attempt to
shield his daughter from outside influences that the custody order
gave her mother the right to control, and declined to rule on a matter
of weighty constitutional concern that could negatively impact the
child when the father’s custodial rights were in dispute.231 In dis-
missing Newdow’s claim, the Court thus preserved the mother’s rights
as legal custodian and decisionmaker and deferred to her judgment
against advancing the claim.
225 Id.
226 Hunt v. Yeatman, 264 F. Supp. 490, 492 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (denying a mother’s motion
to intervene in a case brought on behalf of her child by the child’s father since parents
shared decisionmaking rights over the child).
227 Aronson v. Superior Court, 191 Cal. App. 3d 294, 299 (1987).
228 Id. (“Nowhere in the statute is there language authorizing special exceptions for the
minor whose parents simply refuse to sue when, perhaps, some person would conclude
they should.”).
229 Id.
230 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 5 (2004).
231 Id. at 17.
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C. Extending Constitutional Principles to Parents’ Litigation
Decisions
If we recognize parents’ litigation decisions as a component of
parents’ fundamental liberty interests in caretaking, the Supreme
Court’s decision in Troxel v. Granville232 offers guidance regarding
the appropriate balance of decisionmaking authority between fit par-
ents and courts under the Due Process Clause. In short, due process
requires that courts give the decisions of fit parents special weight and
that courts not substitute their own decisions just because they believe
a “better” decision could be made.233
In Troxel, the Court held unconstitutional the decision of a
Washington State superior court that awarded grandparents visitation
against a mother’s wishes.234 The Washington court based the best
interests determination entirely on the judge’s own view of what was
best for the children and did not presume that the mother’s wishes
served the children’s interests.235 To the contrary, the court essentially
gave the mother the burden to prove that the visitation sought by the
grandparents did not serve the children’s interests.236 Consequently,
the Supreme Court viewed the resulting order as essentially the
product of a “simple disagreement” between the mother and the court
about what was best for the children, in which the judge necessarily
prevailed.237 With no evidence that the mother was unfit, the court’s
failure to give the mother’s determination of what would serve her
daughters’ best interests special weight violated her “fundamental
constitutional right to make decisions concerning the rearing of her
own daughters.”238
Troxel’s principles readily extend to the allocation of decision-
making authority between courts and parents regarding the represen-
tation of child litigants. Just as third party custody and visitation
determinations require courts to evaluate what serves children’s best
interests in their broader lives, Rule 17(c) requires courts to evaluate
what serves children’s interests within a particular case.239 Both con-
texts potentially require a court to evaluate a decision made by par-
232 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
233 Id. at 72–73.
234 Id. at 61–63.
235 Id. at 69.
236 Id.
237 Id. at 67, 72.
238 Id. at 69–70.
239 FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c); see also supra notes 147–50 and accompanying text (discussing
interpretations of Rule 17(c)).
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ents on behalf of their children and determine whether to affirm or
override a parent’s choice.
Thus, in determining what serves a child litigant’s interests,
Troxel requires courts to give special weight to the views of the child’s
parents as to who should represent the child, presuming that fit par-
ents act in their children’s interests. A mere disagreement between the
court and the parents regarding how the case would best proceed does
not justify the court infringing upon a parent’s decisionmaking rights.
Instead, consistent with the Due Process Clause, courts should over-
ride parents’ decisions—for example, by appointing guardians ad
litem or designating non-parent next friends over parents’ objec-
tions—only where there is evidence that parental representation of
the child (or parental failure to act) will cause actual and substantial
harm to the child’s interests in the case.
Litigation is a unique sphere of parental decisionmaking in that it
allows the court ongoing oversight of parents and the impact of their
decisionmaking on children. This unusual level of oversight should
give courts confidence in deferring to parents, as courts will have
future opportunities to intervene upon evidence of actual harm. Yet,
the occurrence of this conflict of authority on courts’ territory gives
courts a coercive advantage over parents that courts must work to mit-
igate. This acute power disparity, coupled with courts’ superior exper-
tise in the litigation process, may encourage courts to override parents
more often than they might in other contexts. Parents also might be
timid in asserting their decisionmaking rights against the court, for
fear of angering the judge and harming the ultimate success of their
children’s claims. In undertaking their responsibility to assure chil-
dren’s interests remain adequately protected, courts must act with
restraint and recognize that parents’ litigation decisions for children
inevitably account for and balance many other interests significant to
an individual child—interests about which courts may have little
insight.240 Courts must proceed with humility about what they do not
know about children’s lives outside the courtroom and resist the
temptation to override parents simply because courts believe a
“better” decision could be made.
In sum, the question of whether and how to represent a child’s
interests in litigation can be understood as a parenting choice (or
series of choices) undertaken to protect and care for a child. Constitu-
tional principles and practical realities provide doctrinal and policy
240 See supra notes 193–210, 229 and accompanying text (explaining that parents’
decisions about whether to litigate, and how to litigate, are often influenced by factors
outside of the legal action, including cultural, economic, and safety considerations).
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foundations for a default of court deference to parents as the appro-
priate decisionmakers for their children in courts.
III
A DEFAULT OF DEFERENCE TO PARENTS
Recognizing the constitutional dimensions of parents’ litigation
decisions provides a principled basis for unifying Rule 17(c) analysis
with regard to parents through the establishment of a default rule of
deference to parents. Establishing such a rule requires not only the
reconciliation of parents’ and courts’ overlapping responsibilities for
child litigants but also the rights of children themselves.
A. Establishing a General Framework
In implementing a default rule favoring parents, the full unifica-
tion of Rule 17(c) doctrine would benefit the public and the courts by
facilitating access to justice for child litigants and streamlining the
administration of litigation involving child parties. To this end, par-
ents’ constitutional decisionmaking authority supports recognizing
them as general representatives for purposes of federal law—either
“general guardians” or “like fiduciaries”—who are automatically
authorized to represent their children under Rule 17(c)(1).241 At a
minimum, constitutional doctrine requires courts to treat parents as
next friends or guardians ad litem by default under Rule 17(c)(2).242
Under each of these approaches, parents would be understood to have
the right of first refusal to represent their children’s litigation interests
and have priority over all other potential representatives, unless a
parent’s decisionmaking rights have been limited by previous court
order, such as a legal custody order or an order appointing another
adult to serve as a child’s general guardian.243
241 Several courts have reserved the authority to interpret Rule 17(c) without reference
to state law to facilitate their ability to protect children’s interests. See Neilson v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 199 F.3d 642, 656 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that “the district court was not
obligated to apply” a New York statute that arguably limited the type of guardian
permitted to seek settlement approval); see also 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 41, § 1571,
at 681 (“[I]nsofar as state law might be read to preclude the federal court from exercising
its appointive power under Rule 17(c), it must give way, Rule 17(b) notwithstanding.”). See
generally Scott & Scott, supra note 164 (conceiving of parenting as a fiduciary relationship
between parent and child).
242 FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c)(2).
243 See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 17 (2004) (holding that a
state court order can deprive a parent of a right to sue on behalf of a child when the other
parent was given sole legal custodianship). The doctrinal calculation changes in cases
where parents have lost their decisionmaking rights as a result of family court orders.
Parents who lack legal custody over their children are not entitled to the same
constitutional deference that legal custodians receive. Id.; see also Smith, supra note 67, at
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Yet, as a practical matter, because children’s litigation representa-
tives have the same authority and responsibilities within a case regard-
less of their particular designation, the implementation of a default
rule favoring parents does not depend on how (or if) federal doctrine
ultimately resolves the questions of whether parents qualify as “gen-
eral guardians,” “next friends,” or “guardians ad litem.” Moreover,
because federal constitutional principles extend equally to federal and
state law, the implementation of a default rule does not depend on
how federal doctrine resolves the question of whether the designated
role for parent representatives (as guardian, next friend, or guardian
ad litem) is a matter of state or federal law. Under each of these per-
mutations, constitutional principles require courts to inquire whether
a child litigant has a parent or parents who possess rights of legal cus-
tody and to defer to the wishes of such parents as a general rule.
Adopting a deference to parents within Rule 17(c) analysis would
not take away from courts’ continued authority to act to protect child
litigants, but it would limit the circumstances justifying court interven-
tion when a parent seeks to represent a child. A court could not
appoint a non-parent next friend or guardian ad litem over a parent’s
objection just because the court believes that doing so would be a
“better” decision than allowing a parent to serve. While presuming in
the ordinary case that parents seeking to represent their children are
acting in the children’s best interests, courts would retain their
authority to override parents’ decisions upon evidence of parental
unfitness or that a parent’s representation is harming a child’s inter-
ests in the case.
Perhaps the clearest example of when harm warranting court
intervention would arise occurs where a parent’s own interests in the
outcome of the matter are adverse to a child’s.244 Conflicts of interest
276 (“[M]inor guardianship [is] used today primarily to give legal authority to relative
caregivers when a parent is in crisis.”).
244 Such issues arise in cases brought by minors seeking to secure abortions through
judicial bypass processes that obviate the need for parental consent. See M.S. v. Wermers,
557 F.2d 170, 176 (8th Cir. 1977) (“Parents should not be appointed to act as guardians ad
litem in litigation challenging a grant of parental veto power.”). This posture would also
arise if a parent was the defendant in a case brought by a child, see T.W. ex rel. Enk v.
Brophy, 124 F.3d 893, 895 (7th Cir. 1997), or it might arise in a case brought by a parent
challenging actions taken by child services agencies. Perhaps because parents who have
interacted with the child welfare system are disproportionately low income, such cases
typically are dismissed for the parents’ failure to retain counsel on behalf of the child
without consideration of the parents’ suitability to serve as the child’s representative. See,
e.g., Santos v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Human Servs., 532 F. App’x 29, 31 n.1 (3d Cir. 2013)
(considering only the individual claims of appellant, acting pro se, and not the claims
asserted by appellant on behalf of his minor children because the children were not
represented by counsel); Whitfield v. Johnson, No. 18-CV-1232 (WFK) (LB), 2018 WL
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that pose harm to a child may also arise where parents and children
have divergent financial interests in a case, for example where a pro-
posed settlement agreement would allot separate awards to a parent
and child, one thus arguably detracting from an amount otherwise
available to the other.245 But experience suggests that courts should
exercise restraint in identifying conflicts that would preclude parent
representation, as the adoption of a broad view of disqualifying con-
flicts risks supplanting parent representatives in every case.246 In
reality, the interests of parents and children, including their financial
interests and economic well-being, are often entangled.247 Rather than
supplanting parents at the mere prospect of conflict, implementing
constitutional principles requires courts to presume that fit parents act
in children’s best interests, and exclude parents only upon evidence
that parent representation is actually causing harm to a child at the
time the question is raised.248
1385890, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2018) (“It is well-settled that a non-attorney parent
cannot appear on behalf of his or her child.”), aff’d, 763 F. App’x 106 (2d Cir. 2019).
245 Burns v. United States, No. 12-CV-2957-DMS (MDD), 2015 WL 12564299, at *5–6
(S.D. Cal. May 13, 2015) (recognizing that parents might have a conflict of interest as
guardians ad litem if they were to receive money in a settlement that could have gone to
their daughter, and requiring that the parents address this concern when petitioning for
approval of the settlement award).
246 For example, one court held that a parent’s payment of attorney’s fees on behalf of
that parent’s child created a financial conflict of interest that precluded the parent from
serving as the child’s representative in the case. See Scott v. District of Columbia, 197
F.R.D. 10, 11 (D.D.C. 2000). Combined with current doctrine prohibiting parents from
litigating cases on behalf of their children pro se, and courts’ reluctance to appoint counsel
for parents bringing children’s claims, a widespread adoption of the Scott court’s view
would result in the disqualification of parents as children’s representatives in every case.
But the Scott court’s view is out of step with historical and modern day practice. See
Moore, supra note 23, at 1846 (“[I]n the ordinary case (that is, excluding cases of inherent
conflict such as custody, abuse or neglect, and termination of parental rights), parents are
expected not only to ‘foot the bill,’ [for counsel] but also to play an active role in directing
the course of the representation.” (citations omitted)).
247 See, e.g., Machadio v. Apfel, 276 F.3d 103, 107 (2d Cir. 2002) (exempting children’s
claims for Supplemental Security Income brought by parents from the general mandate
that parents retain counsel because parents’ and children’s financial interests in such cases
intertwine); see also Scott & Scott, supra note 164, at 2437 (“Parents’ and children’s
interests are extensively intertwined, and many decisions that parents make affect their
own lives as well as those of their children.”).
248 Burke v. Smith, 252 F.3d 1260, 1264 (11th Cir. 2001) (affirming district court’s
decision to permit mother to represent child’s interests and not consider the appointment
of a guardian ad litem where there was no evidence of a conflict of interest at the time of
the litigation); Jeffery v. O’Donnell, 702 F. Supp. 513, 515 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (permitting
parents to represent their children’s interests in case asserting prerogative to home school
because “it [was] not yet clear that a conflict of interests exists in this case”); Aves ex rel.
Aves v. Shah, No. 88-1669-K, 1991 WL 126612, at *15–16 (D. Kan. June 4, 1991) (declining
to appoint guardian ad litem to replace parent representatives based on possibility of
future conflicts of interest with regard to the distribution of damage awards to child where
there was no evidence of present conflicts of interest).
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Likewise, courts should not presume harm where a parent
declines to act. As courts have recognized, a parent’s decision not to
pursue an available claim is not necessarily cause for intervention—
parents can reasonably decide that litigation does not serve a child’s
best interests.249 Absent specific evidence of harm, parental decisions
not to litigate should be respected.
Where courts conclude a non-parent representative should be
appointed, courts might provide an alternative means for parents to
express their views of what best serves their children’s interests to the
court, for example, by permitting parents to intervene under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 24,250 or by appointing a guardian ad litem in
addition to rather than in lieu of a parent representative.251 Such alter-
natives are not an adequate substitute for a parent’s sole representa-
tion of a child’s interests in every case, as the participation of a second
decisionmaker for a child necessarily dilutes the force and effect of
parents’ input into the case. Guardian ad litem appointment also
potentially imposes additional financial costs on child litigants or their
opponents.252 Nonetheless, by permitting parents whom the court has
excluded from representation to intervene, courts can provide a mech-
anism through which to gain insight into the complexities of children’s
needs and interests that parents are well-suited to provide.
B. Accounting for Children’s Perspective
Children are typically expected to play little to no role in
advancing their legal claims precisely because of their legal incapaci-
ties as children. Yet, despite their general legal incapacity, a few cir-
cumstances warrant courts’ consideration of children’s own views
when applying Rule 17(c).
First and foremost, courts may be called upon to consider chil-
dren’s views when cases involve questions of children’s fundamental
rights and children and their parents disagree on the issues at stake in
the litigation.253 Such cases present particularly thorny questions,
249 See Developmental Disabilities Advocacy Ctr., Inc. v. Melton, 689 F.2d 281, 285–86
(1st Cir. 1982) (declining to permit non-parent next friend to bring case on behalf of child
whose mother objected to the lawsuit, stating “while it seems clear that Harold’s mother
disagreed with Freda Smith over the wisdom of the present suit, there is no indication in
the record that she abused her trust in doing so”).
250 FED. R. CIV. P. 24.
251 See Horacek v. Exon, 357 F. Supp. 71, 74 (D. Neb. 1973) (appointing a guardian ad
litem to serve in addition to parent representatives).
252 See supra note 160 and accompanying text (suggesting that guardian ad litem fees
might disproportionately burden those least able to afford additional costs).
253 See Robert B. Keiter, Privacy, Children, and Their Parents: Reflections on and
Beyond the Supreme Court’s Approach, 66 MINN. L. REV. 459, 460 (1982) (stating that the
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requiring courts to balance the general deference owed to fit parents
with the protection the Constitution extends to children themselves as
persons under the law.254 Yet, “[s]imply because the decision of a
parent is not agreeable to a child . . . does not automatically transfer
the power to make that decision from the parents to some agency or
officer of the state.”255 Children’s constitutional rights are not equal to
adults’ precisely because of their “peculiar vulnerability,” “their
inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner,”
and “the importance of the parental role in child rearing.”256 In prac-
tice, the Supreme Court generally has not concerned itself with chil-
dren’s own views about the matters their parents seek to redress,
instead relying on parents’ representations about what serves chil-
dren’s interests absent children’s active dissent.257 Taken together,
Supreme Court’s extension of constitutional privacy rights to children assures that the
Court must undertake “the eventual task of reconciling the rights and interests asserted by
children in actual or potential conflict with those of their parents. The claimed right to a
child of privacy in individual matters inevitably clashes with the longstanding parental right
of authority in directing the child’s life” (citations omitted)). Scholars continue to debate
how this conflict of rights should be reconciled. See generally Anne C. Dailey & Laura A.
Rosenbury, The New Law of the Child, 127 YALE L.J. 1448 (2018) (discussing a new
framework for addressing children’s interests in relation to parental rights and state
control); Martin Guggenheim, The (Not So) New Law of the Child, 127 YALE L.J. FORUM
942 (2018) (calling for a new vision of a “law of the child” centered around addressing
structural inequality); Huntington & Scott, supra note 29 (manuscript at 3–4) (suggesting
that a framework of “child wellbeing” might relax perceived tension between children’s
rights and parental authority). A full accounting of how courts should respond to this
problem is beyond the scope of this project and the subject of a work in progress by the
author.
254 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (plurality opinion) (“The unique role
in our society of the family, the institution by which ‘we inculcate and pass down many of
our most cherished values, moral and cultural,’ requires that constitutional principles be
applied with sensitivity and flexibility to the special needs of parents and children.”
(quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503–04 (1977) (plurality
opinion))).
255 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602–03 (1979).
256 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634–35; see also McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550
(1971) (plurality opinion) (holding juveniles are not entitled to a trial by jury in
delinquency cases and stating: “[O]ur cases show that, although children generally are
protected by the same constitutional guarantees against governmental deprivations as are
adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system to account for children’s vulnerability
and their needs for ‘concern, . . . sympathy, and . . . paternal attention’”).
257 See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 4 (2004) (not questioning
mother’s representation that, as a Christian, her daughter did not object to hearing or
reciting the pledge of allegiance’s reference to God); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241
(1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority regards the religious rights of
Amish parents as an interest shared with their children, even if that is not the case); see
also Jeffery v. O’Donnell, 702 F. Supp. 513, 515–16 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (declining to appoint a
guardian ad litem where a parent’s and child’s interests regarding the child’s education
aligned, and noting that the court would reconsider the decision if evidence that the
parent’s and child’s interests diverged appeared in the future).
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Supreme Court doctrine regarding parent/child decisionmaking con-
flicts suggests that the presumption in favor of a fit parent may be
overcome in such cases when three circumstances coincide: the sub-
stantive law at issue gives the child some decisionmaking authority,
the child meets whatever preconditions exist for exercising that
authority (e.g., maturity), and the parent and the child in fact
disagree.258
To date, the Supreme Court has explicitly conferred independent
decisionmaking authority to children solely within the context of abor-
tion.259 Here, the Court shifts the balance of decisionmaking authority
between children and parents in light of the “unique nature and con-
sequences of the abortion decision,”260 namely, that the decision
cannot be postponed and entails “grave and indelible” conse-
quences.261 These features make it inappropriate to give parents a
blanket, absolute veto over their children’s decisions about whether to
have an abortion or carry a pregnancy to term.262 Yet, the Court con-
258 See Lisa Vollendorf Martin, What’s Love Got to Do with It: Securing Access to Justice
for Teens, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 457, 468–85 (2012) (discussing the different ways states
allow minors to vindicate their rights contra their parents). A full account of the
reconciliation of parent/child conflicts over federal litigation is beyond the scope of this
Article and is the subject of a work in progress by the author. Some have argued that
courts should grant minors independent control when such conflicts arise. See, e.g., Sara
Jeruss, Empty Promises? How State Procedural Rules Block LGBT Minors from
Vindicating Their Substantive Rights, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 853 (2009) (arguing that states
should explore ways to allow certain minors to bring lawsuits without parent involvement
or even notification); Brumley, supra note 204, at 351 (suggesting that courts should
occasionally allow minors to make independent decisions when their interests might
diverge with their parents’); Katharine A. Butler, Comment, A Chance to be Heard: An
Application of Bellotti v. Baird to the Civil Commitment of Minors, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1285,
1287–88 (1981) (same).
259 The Court recognized the potential significance of the child’s own views regarding
reciting or hearing the pledge of allegiance in Newdow, but was not required to decide
whether the child’s or her parent’s views regarding the litigation should take precedence as
the child’s and her legal custodian parent’s views aligned, and the Court found that her
father, who held a different view, lacked standing to sue because he lacked legal custody.
See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 9, 17. State legislatures have granted adolescents the right to
make a range of additional decisions independent from their parents, including whether to
seek a restraining order against a violent dating partner; “emergency and outpatient
medical care”; “testing and treatment for sexually transmitted diseases”; “substance-abuse
treatment”; “outpatient mental-health services”; and “reproductive health care.” Martin,
supra note 258, at 471, 480–82, 503–04. At least one state appellate court has authorized
adolescents to bring suit over parental objection or without notice to parents in a context
outside of abortion. See Buckholz v. Leveille, 194 N.W.2d 427, 429 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971)
(permitting sixteen-year-old to bring suit to challenge school dress code against parents’
wishes).
260 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643.
261 Id. at 642.
262 Id. at 643; see also Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74
(1976).
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cluded that not all children would be well-situated to make even this
critical decision on their own. Thus, children who seek to receive an
abortion without parental consent must seek judicial approval. To do
so, children must demonstrate that they are sufficiently mature to
make the decision independently, or that, despite their immaturity, an
abortion serves their best interests.263
Because children must appear before courts to overcome
parental consent requirements for abortion, courts must determine
who should exercise decisionmaking authority for the child within the
litigation. Courts disqualify parents as decisionmakers for children in
such “judicial bypass” proceedings because parents’ and children’s
decisionmaking rights are in direct conflict, and even notifying a
child’s parents about the proceeding could significantly harm the pri-
vacy interests a child seeks to advance.264 Thus, in judicial bypass pro-
ceedings, rather than defer to parents as decisionmakers, courts
instead must consider the appropriateness of any non-parent next
friend seeking to represent the child’s interests and whether the
appointment of a guardian ad litem is required.265 Courts have per-
mitted children to represent their own interests without any adult rep-
resentative in judicial bypass proceedings where the child was mature,
represented by counsel, and was supported by other adults who did
not formally appear in the litigation.266
Outside of the context of child/parent rights conflicts, it may also
be appropriate and beneficial for courts to consider children’s wishes
263 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643–44.
264 M.S. v. Wermers, 557 F.2d 170, 176 (8th Cir. 1977) (“Since it would be inappropriate
to appoint the parents [as guardians ad litem] in this case, it was equally inappropriate and
unnecessary to condition the further progress of the lawsuit upon notification to the
parents of the hearing on the appointment.”).
265 See, e.g., Wermers, 557 F.2d at 176; Noe v. True, 507 F.2d 9, 11–12 (6th Cir. 1974)
(holding that a lower court’s failure to consider appointing a guardian ad litem for an
unrepresented minor was an error, especially given that “the legal issues are controversial
in nature, the plaintiff is a minor, pregnant out of wedlock, without the benefit of a natural
parent or guardian, and . . . her legal guardian is the defendant in the lawsuit”); Foe v.
Vanderhoof, 389 F. Supp. 947, 957 (D. Colo. 1975) (considering the appointment of a
guardian ad litem, and ultimately concluding that plaintiff’s interests were sufficiently
protected without a guardian ad litem).
266 See Foe, 389 F. Supp. at 957 (“[P]laintiff’s interests were sufficiently protected by her
attorneys and social worker . . . so as to obviate the necessity of appointment of a guardian
to represent her. She has evidenced understanding of the legal and personal implications of
this action and is capable of bringing the action on her own behalf.”). Relatedly, a number
of states have granted adolescents the legal capacity to represent their own interests in
state court cases brought to obtain civil restraining orders to protect themselves from
domestic and dating violence, sexual assault, and stalking. See Lisa V. Martin, Restraining
Forced Marriage, 18 NEV. L.J. 919, 998–99 (2018) (summarizing state statutes granting
minors legal capacity to seek restraining orders on their own); Martin, supra note 258, at
468–86.
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when exercising their discretion under Rule 17(c) where the parental
presumption has been overcome. Courts might seek a mature child’s
input, for example, when deciding between prospective non-parent
next friends267 or determining whether and whom to appoint as a
guardian ad litem. Permitting mature children’s input into such deci-
sions is consistent with best practices guidance for attorneys repre-
senting child clients, and it is reflective of the recognition that older
children may have “the ability to understand, deliberate upon, and
reach conclusions about matters affecting [their] own well-being . . .
and thus have the right to make decisions [about the course of
litigation/legal matters with attorneys] on their own behalf.”268 For all
of these reasons, when courts act to protect children’s interests under
Rule 17(c), courts also should consider whether to take a child’s
expressed wishes into account.
CONCLUSION
Currently, federal courts claim the authority to infringe on par-
ents’ constitutional rights when parents bring civil claims on behalf of
their children. Courts exercise this authority without any analysis of
the constitutional rights at stake. Instead, courts rely on the broad dis-
cretion seemingly offered to them under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 17(c), combined with a lack of clarity about its meaning, to
make whatever decision the court finds appropriate in a particular
case—including appointing non-parents to represent children in court
over a parent’s objection. In the process, courts create doctrinal dis-
array and procedural confusion and inefficiencies. Most significantly,
they deprive parents of the opportunity and right to parent by way of
bringing those claims for their children, and they deprive children of
the benefits of parental insight.
Parents should not be understood to leave their rights at the
courthouse door. A parent’s act of bringing litigation on behalf of her
child is a parenting decision, the very caretaking protected by the
Constitution. Deferring to parents as the default litigation representa-
tives for children in the ways proposed here, therefore, would protect
267 See Tinsley v. Flanagan, No. CV-15-00185-PHX-ROS, 2016 WL 8200450, at *6 (D.
Ariz. May 13, 2016) (recognizing that consideration of a minor’s expressed interests might
be critical to a determination of who should serve as a minor’s next friend, but noting that
the minor’s express permission is not required for an adult to serve in this role).
268 Moore, supra note 23, at 1848–49 (citations omitted). Children also may indirectly
control the outcome of Rule 17(c) analysis, as in some states, minors fourteen years and
older have the power to designate the guardians of their estates, who would have priority
in advancing their claims. See CLARK, supra note 64, § 9.4, at 563; L.S. Tellier, Annotation,
Right of Infant to Select His Own Guardian, 85 A.L.R.2d 921, § 3 (1962); see, e.g., In re
Antonio R.A., 719 S.E.2d 850, 856 (W. Va. 2011).
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parents’ constitutional liberty interests, promote children’s well-being,
facilitate children’s access to justice, and streamline court oversight of
claims brought on behalf of children.
